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This paper first employs principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce an alternative UK
corporate governance disclosure index to the US-centric ones. Second, we then investigate whether this new
corporate governance disclosure index can determine the level of executive pay (including CEOs, CFOs, and all
executive directors) in UK listed firms, and consequently ascertain whether the governance mechanisms can
moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Employing data on corporate governance, executive pay and
performance from 2008 to 2013, we find that, on average, better-governed firms tend to pay their executives
lower compared with their poorly-governed counterparts. Additionally, our findings suggest that the pay-
for-performance sensitivity is generally positive, but improves in firms with high corporate governance quality,
implying that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is contingent on the quality of internal governance structures. We
interpret our findings within the predictions of optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis.
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Introduction
The agency theoretic literature has suggested several
monitoring (e.g., good corporate governance practices)
and incentive alignment (e.g., executive pay packages)
mechanisms that can be employed to mitigate agency
conflicts in modern corporations (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Beatty and
Zajac, 1994). Noticeably, studies examining the extent to
which executive pay packages can be used to mitigate
agency problems in public corporations are underpinned
by two main theoretical perspectives with deep roots in
rational agency theory: (i) managerial power hypothesis;
and (ii) optimal contracting theory (Jensen and Murphy,
1990; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Mallin et al., 2015; van Essen
et al., 2015). Briefly, the managerial power hypothesis
assumes that in firms with weak corporate governance
structures, opportunistic and powerful corporate
executives directly determine their own pay packages by
controlling the executive pay setting process (Bebchuk
et al., 2002), and thus the managerial power hypothesis
does not expect executive pay to be necessarily related
to corporate performance. Managerial power hypothesis
can, therefore, be more applicable under a poor corporate
governance regime. By contrast, the optimal contracting
theory suggests that executive pay results from arms-
length negotiations between independent corporate boards
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and managers, leading to executive pay packages that are
able to optimise managerial performance (Edmans and
Gabaix, 2009; Conyon, 2014), and therefore the optimal
contracting theory expects a strong pay-for-performance
sensitivity (PPS). Hence, the optimal contracting theory
can be expected to operate better under a good corporate
governance condition.
Due to varied reasons underlying executive pay,
Amzaleg et al. (2014), Core et al. (1999, 2003), Murphy
(1999), Newton (2015), and Sapp (2008), among others,
have strived to investigate its determinants. However, the
existing literature suffers from a number of observable
limitations. First, despite the importance of good
corporate governance practices and the considerable
amount of corporate governance reforms that have been
pursued worldwide (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra,
2004), existing literature, such as Amzaleg et al. (2014),
Conyon and Murphy (2000), and Ozkan (2011), has
almost focused exclusively on how or whether executive
pay can be influenced by corporate performance/PPS,
but performance is arguably only one possible
determinant of executive pay. In contrast, few studies,
such as those conducted by Adams and Ferreira (2009),
Conyon (1997), Dong and Ozkan (2008) and Ozkan
(2011), have examined whether and how firm-level
corporate governance structures may influence executive
pay, and thereby limiting current understanding of the
effect of good corporate governance practices on
executive pay.
Second, from a theoretical and practitioner point of
view, corporate governance is important in corporate
decision-making and thus, should and is expected to
influence corporate outcomes (Larcker et al., 2007; Foss
and Stea, 2014). Indeed, this expectation is reflected in
the large volume of studies that have investigated the
effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on
different managerial behaviour and corporate outcomes
(e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Murphy, 1999;
Gompers et al., 2003; Donadelli et al., 2014; Serra et al.,
2016; Granado-Peiró and López-Gracia, 2017). However
and as corporate governance is a complex ‘concept’ to
operationalise, existing studies have either mostly
employed single corporate governance mechanisms, such
as board size and ownership structure (e.g., Morck et al.,
1988; Yermack, 1996) or some form of arbitrarily
constructed composite governance disclosure indices
(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Karpoff
et al., 2016). Observably, and despite a general consensus
on its importance, the findings of a vast majority of
existing governance studies aremixed, and thereby raising
major questions as to whether these governance
‘constructs’ that are often employed are actually ‘valid’
proxies (single governance structures or governance
disclosure indices) for the complex concept
(‘governance’) that they seek to measure (‘construct
validity’) (Black et al., 2017). On the one hand, Larcker
et al. (2007, p.964) argue that the potential measurement
error that may be introduced from employing the use of
single governance mechanisms (e.g., board size), “will
almost certainly cause the regression coefficients to be
inconsistent”.
On the other hand, other researchers have sought to
address the measurement error issue by constructing
governance indices that contain multiple provisions.
There are, however, three major problems associated
with such indices. First, and because there is no
theoretical basis for selecting governance provisions,
such indices are often naively constructed (Brown and
Caylor, 2006), and thereby equally resulting in similar
measurement errors (Larcker et al., 2007; Black et al.,
2017). Second, it is not only practically impossible to
include all relevant governance provisions, but also
likely that not all the included provisions will be
relevant, and therefore measurement problems, such as
omitted variables bias are likely to persist in such
governance indices (Larcker et al., 2007; Black et al.,
2017; Karpoff et al., 2016).1 Consequently, a small, but
gradually increasing number of researchers have recently
employed statistical approaches in developing more
reliable governance indices (e.g., Black et al., 2017;
Karpoff et al.,2016; Larcker et al., 2007). Larcker et al.
(2007), for example, employ principal component
analysis to develop an alternative disclosure index
containing 14 key components out of 39 governance
provisions for US firms, and they demonstrate that it is
more reliable and better specified compared with
previous ones, such as the G-disclosure index. We thus
employ the principal component analysis approach to
develop an alternative corporate governance disclosure
index for UK firms.
Third and despite increasing anecdotal evidence
suggesting that other corporate executives below the
CEOs, such as CFOs pay packages are getting equally
significant in magnitude, existing studies have mainly
investigated the antecedents of CEO pay (e.g., Core
et al., 1999; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Adams and Ferreira,
2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Guest, 2009; Gregory-Smith,
2012; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012), and thereby relatively
1For example, Gompers et al. (2003) constructed an influential equally weighted
governance disclosure index (‘G-index) that contained 24 US shareholder rights
provisions and showed that firms with poor governance had lower operating
profits, market valuation and stock returns compared with their better-governed
counterparts. However, successive researchers, such as Cremers and Nair
(2005), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Karpoff et al. (2016) have demonstrated that
only six (entrenchment-index, E-index), 18 (other-index, O-index), and 12
(deterrent-index, D-index) of the 24 governance items, respectively, are relevant
and often not just contradicting the findings of Gompers et al. (2003), but also
among themselves. In addition, these indices are generally for US firms with
no alternative (there are few commercial agencies, such as Governance Metric
International, Institute of Shareholder Service, Credit Lyonnais Securities, and
Standard & Poors, that construct commercial indices for sale, but they are often
copyrighted and not freely available) indices for other countries, such as the UK.
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little is known about the impact of firm-level corporate
governance on the pay packages of other executives, such
as CFOs and all other executive directors.
Fourth, the existing studies that have investigated the
executive pay-performance nexus generally suggest that
the relationship is positive, but weak (e.g., Jensen and
Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996). However, a major
limitation of these studies is that they only control for a
small number of corporate governance variables that
may affect the PPS. In response to this limitation, the more
recent and subsequent studies have controlled for a large
number of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e.,
including board and ownership structure), when
examining the link between executive pay and corporate
performance (e.g., Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999;
Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Guest,
2009; Ozkan, 2011; Gregory-Smith, 2012; Jouber and
Fakhfakh, 2012). However, and despite controlling for a
large set of corporate governance variables, these studies
report similar positive and weak PPS. An observable
limitation of these studies is that they do not sufficiently
consider possible endogeneity concerns that may result
from simultaneously employing both the incentive
alignment (executive pay) and monitoring mechanisms
(corporate governance) by firms to reduce agency
conflicts (Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b). Arguably, this may
explain the observably weak PPS reported by past studies
and may also limit current understanding of the extent to
which firm-level corporate governance quality can
moderate the link between executive pay and firm
performance. Finally, and despite the theoretical and
empirical suggestions that most corporate decisions,
including executive pay is mainly a function of top
management team and ownership structure (Ntim et al.,
2015a, 2015b), there is a clear dearth of studies examining
how board structure, CEO power and ownership structure
variables may affect executive pay. Arguably, this also
limits our understanding of the extent to which board
structure, CEO power and ownership mechanisms can
impact executive pay.
Given these noticeable weaknesses of the extant
literature, we seek to investigate the impact of firm-level
corporate governance on executive pay and the PPS
among UK listed firms. There are a number of reasons,
which motivated us to focus on the UK corporate setting.
First, since 1992, the UK has been at the forefront of
pursuing arguably the most influential global corporate
governance reforms (Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel
Report, 1998; DRR, 2002; Higgs Report, 2003; Smith
Report, 2003; FRC, 2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b). For
example, most countries around the world have adopted
the recommendations of the 1992 Cadbury Report, and
intergovernmental organisations, such as World Bank,
have also issued guidelines and principles, which reflect
the content of the UK corporate governance codes. Thus,
the findings2 of our study may not only be relevant to the
UK, but also to other countries, which are currently
pursuing corporate governance reforms around the world.
Second, the UK has strong shareholder activism with a
good track record of implementing and enforcing
corporate regulations. Third, the markets for products,
services, capital, managerial and corporate control are
fairly active, and thereby serving as an effective external
corporate governance mechanism that can restrain
executive abuse. Arguably, these contextual charac-
teristics make the UK an ideal corporate environment to
examine the impact of corporate governance practices on
executive pay and the PPS.
This study, therefore, seeks to extend, as well as make a
number of new contributions to the growing body of
literature on the antecedents of executive pay. First, it
contributes to the literature by employing a principal
component analysis technique to develop and introduce
a new alternative governance disclosure index containing
31 key components out of 120 comprehensive governance
provisions from the UKCombined Code for UK firms and
researchers. Second, it contributes to the extant literature
by examining the impact of a broad corporate governance
disclosure index on executive pay. Third, we contribute to
the existing literature by providing evidence on the extent
to which board structure (i.e., board size and diversity),
CEO power (i.e., CEO tenure, CEO duality and CEO
pay slice), and ownership structure (i.e., managerial,
institutional and block ownership) can explain differences
in executive pay. Fourth, this study contributes to the
literature by providing new evidence on how corporate
governance can impact on the annual cash (i.e., bonus,
salary, and other cash payments) and equity-based
(i.e., performance share plan and any other long-term
incentive plans) pay of CEOs, CFOs and all other
executive directors. Finally, given that directors’ incentives
and corporate governance mechanisms may act either as
complements and/or substitutes, it distinctively seeks to
contribute to the existing literature by investigating
whether corporate governance can moderate the PPS. We
employ traditional ordinary least squares regressions in
addition to lagged-effects, fixed-effects, GMM and
2We note that although the recommendations of the 1992 Cadbury Report have
been adopted worldwide, the UK has different economic system and
characteristics compared to not only developing countries that adopted the code,
but also to other developed countries. For example, the markets for products,
services and corporate control are more active in the US than UK, and this is
due to the fact that competition in the UK is tightly controlled by the
Competition and Markets Authority. Further, shareholder activism is stronger
in US. In contrast, stakeholder activism (i.e., general public outrage and
activism) is much stronger in the UK. Additionally, firms in civil law countries
(e.g., Germany and France) are characterised by weak protection of minority
shareholders compared with firms in common law countries (e.g., UK and
Ireland). Therefore, our results should be interpreted with great caution because
there are apparent differences even among developed countries.
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Heckman selection bias regression techniques in testing
the robustnesses of our contributions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The
following sectionbriefly discusses corporate governance
and executive pay policy reforms that have been pursued
in the UK. The third section reviews related literature
and develops hypotheses. The research design is
described in the fourth section, while empirical findings
are discussed in the fifth section. The sixth section
concludes the paper.
Corporate governance, executive pay and
the UK corporate context
The need to improve corporate governance practices in the
UK increased since the late 1980s, and particularly after
the occurrence of a series of major corporate failures, such
as the collapse of Britain’s Barings Bank (Aguilera and
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). This period was discernibly
characterised by poor transparency, accountability,
performance and excessive executive pay (Conyon and
Mallin, 1997; Pye, 2000; Pass, 2006). Consequently, and
since the early 1990s, several legislations and reports have
been introduced aimed at promoting high standards of
corporate governance by enhancing accountability and
transparency among UK listed firms. For example, the
Cadbury Committee was established in 1991 and issued
its final report in 1992. The report included
recommendations relating to board structures, financial
reporting, auditing and internal controls. With specific
regard to executive pay, the Cadbury Report required
every listed firm to establish a remuneration committee
with a majority of its members being unaffiliated
directors, including the chairman of the committee. The
report also recommends UK listed firms to disclose more
information relating to the total payments made to the
chairperson/highest-paid director. However, a key
limitation of the Cadbury Report is that it focused mainly
on the financial aspects of corporate governance and
neglected other equally important aspects of governance,
including the disclosure of detailed pay packages of
each director (Dong andOzkan, 2008; Conyon and Sadler,
2010).
To overcome the limitations of the Cadbury Report, as
well as to reduce the widespread public concerns about
excessive executive pay in UK listed firms, the Greenbury
Report was issued in 1995. The report aimed at addressing
issues relating to executive pay in UK listed firms with
specific focus on enhancing the link between executive
pay and performance through increased disclosures
relating to executive pay. Also, the Greenbury Report
recommended that every listed UK firm needed to
establish a remuneration committee, comprising exclu-
sively of independent outside directors with its
chairperson also being an independent non-executive
director. The remuneration committee should also have
terms of reference specifying its function, including
determining the pay package for each director.
Additionally, and unlike the Cadbury Report, the
Greenbury Report suggested that the pay of senior
executives should be set by the board as a whole and
senior executives should not play any part in deciding
their own remuneration. Similarly, the report suggested
that the remuneration committee may invite CEOs to
attend its meetings, and CEOs may help remuneration
committees in setting the pay of other executive directors,
but should not play any part in decisions concerning their
own remuneration.
Another crucial improvement on the Cadbury Report is
that the Greenbury Report required UK listed firms to
disclose additional information on the pay packages of
each executive director (e.g., fees, bonuses, salaries,
benefits in-kind, long-term incentive plans and any
other benefit) in the annual report. The report also
recommended that firms should disclose their core
philosophy and rational underlying their executive pay
packages. Further, the Greenbury Report suggested that
shareholders, particularly institutional ones, should play
an active role in determining executive pay. Additionally,
the Greenbury Report emphasised the crucial role of
institutional shareholders in determining executive pay
by mandating the so-called (‘say-on-pay’) votes, as well
as by requiring that the chairman of the remuneration
committee should be available for consultations with
major shareholders and strive to answer any of their
questions/concerns.
The corporate governance recommendations contained
in Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were then
consolidated in the Hampel Report (1998), permitting its
committee to issue the first UK Combined Code in
1998. Additionally, and in order to increase disclosure
and transparency about EP, the ‘Directors’ Remuneration
Report’ (DRR) regulations were published in 2002, as
amendment to the 1985 Companies Act, and were
subsequently incorporated into the 2006 Companies Act.
The DRR required listed firms to make significant
disclosures, including disclosing information about
remuneration consultants, executive service contracts
and remuneration policy (DRR, 2002; Conyon et al.,
2009). Additionally, and similar to the Greenbury Report’s
recommendations, the DRR also encouraged greater
activism among shareholders by mandating the vote on
executives’ pay (“say-on-pay”). The requirement of
shareholders to be more active in determining executive
pay has also been emphasised in the 2006 Companies
Act (section 439), Combined Codes (1998, 2003, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) and the stewardship
codes (2010, 2012) with specific focus on institutional
shareholders.
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In addition to the above recommendations, corporate
governance provisions relating to the executive pay
section in the Combined Codes (2003, 2006, 2008,
2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) indicate that executives
should be paid sufficiently in order to attract, retain and
encourage them to perform their roles to the best of their
abilities. These codes also recommend that the pay
package of executives should consist of a fair mix of both
cash and equity-based pay. Furthermore, these codes
suggest that high proportions of executive pay should be
linked to performance. It should be acknowledged that,
although complying with the executive pay reforms
contained in all of the above mentioned reports and codes
is voluntary, they have been added to the London Stock
Exchange’s (LSE) listing rules, and thereby making it
difficult to be ignored by UK listed firms (LR. 9.8., n.d.).
Apart from pursing the recent corporate governance
reforms, which have aimed at promoting high corporate
governance standards among UK listed firms, ownership
is relatively highly dispersed, where institutional
shareholders play a crucial role in overseeing and
preventing management from expropriating shareholder
wealth (Mallin et al., 2015). The combination of dispersed
ownership structure with strong shareholder activism and
good record of adopting and imposing corporate
regulations (Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 2015; Melis
et al., 2015) has helped in strengthening the markets for
capital, product, services, managerial and corporate
control in the UK. Consequently, this may help in
reducing a number of agency problems, including
excessive executive pay (Mallin et al., 2015; Newton,
2015). We, therefore, seek to examine whether corporate
governance matters in determining executive pay in UK
listed firms and consequently, ascertain whether corporate
governance moderates the PPS.
Literature review and hypotheses
development
A broad corporate governance disclosure index and
executive pay
Prior literature on executive pay has mainly used two
perspectives of agency theory: (i) managerial power
hypothesis; and (ii) optimal contracting theory (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Edmans and
Gabaix, 2009). Optimal contracting theory suggests that
in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms,
executive pay packages can be designed in a way that
helps to align management and shareholders’ interests
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this case, optimal
contracting theory is more applicable when governance
structures are effective. On the other hand, managerial
power hypothesis suggests that in firms with poor
corporate governance structures, opportunistic executives
can expropriate corporate resources by having the power
to set their own pay (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Choe
et al., 2014). Hence, managerial power hypothesis works
better under a poor governance regime.
Existing empirical literature examining the effect of
corporate governance disclosure indices on executive
pay are rare and therefore, offers opportunities to make
original contribution to the literature. However, prior
research suggests that corporate governance disclosure
indices impact positively on performance/market value
(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beekes and Brown, 2006;
Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012). Therefore, and to
the extent that better-governed firms generate higher
performance than their poorly-governed counterparts, we
will expect firms with high good corporate governance
disclosure index scores to be better placed to constrain
excessive executive pay. Indeed, Jouber and Fakhfakh
(2012) and Newton (2015) offer rare recent evidence in
support of our proposition. Fahlenbrach (2009), for
example, examined the effect of the Gompers et al.
(2003)’s corporate governance disclosure index on
executive pay for a sample of 11,029 US CEOs. His
results suggest that well-governed companies: (i) have
stronger PPS compared with poorly-governed companies;
and (ii) pay their CEOs relatively less. This result implies
that good corporate governance practices influence not
just the levels of executive pay, but also the structure of
their pay. Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) and Newton
(2015) have reported largely similar findings for UK and
US listed companies, respectively. Thus, and in line with
the objectives of the considerable corporate governance
reforms (e.g., 1992 Cadbury Report and 2010 Combined
Code) that have been pursued in the UK over the past
30 years, we expect that in firms with strong corporate
governance structures, executives will have less influence
over their own remuneration and, hence the first
hypothesis to be tested is that:
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative association between
firm-level corporate governance disclosure index score
and executive pay.
Board structure and executive pay
Corporate boards are argued to play crucial roles in terms
of monitoring, controlling and setting pay for managers
that ensures that they act in the best interest of
shareholders (Jensen, 1993; Ozkan, 2007). However, the
ability of a corporate board to conduct its duties
effectively can be influenced by the way it is structured
(e.g., diversity and size) (Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b; Ntim
et al., 2017). Thus, and in our study, we examine the effect
of these two board structures (board size and diversity) on
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executive pay. Theoretically, and in terms of board size, it
is argued that poor governance is often associated with
larger boards, since larger boards tend to be associated
with more communication and coordination problems that
can impair their effectiveness (Yermack, 1996; Bebchuk
et al., 2002). The weak monitoring can lead to managers
rewarding themselves with overly generous pay packages
(Ozkan, 2007; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b). In contrast, it is
argued that larger boards are more effective in monitoring
and controlling the opportunistic behaviours of
management. This is because larger boards are often
associated with more expertise and experience, which
can restrain the influence that managers may have over
board decisions, and thereby allowing the board to design
pay packages that may be more closely aligned with
executive performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990;
Edmans and Gabaix, 2009).
With reference to board diversity, in this study, we focus
mainly on examining the impact of both gender and ethnic
diversity aspects of a corporate board on executive pay.
This is due to two main reasons: (i) these two aspects
can be observed and measured easily (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009); and (ii) these two aspects have been
widely investigated (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). Theoretically, board diversity
can increase managers’ power and influence over board
decisions, including those relating to the level and
structure of executive pay, by appointing few women
and ethnic minorities mainly for symbolic reasons
(Gyapong et al., 2016). By contrast, it is suggested that
board diversity can play a crucial role in improving
board effectiveness, including preventing management
from expropriating shareholders’ wealth by increasing
managerial monitoring and also by bringing diverse
perspectives, knowledge, experience and ideas to the
board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003).
The empirical evidence relating to the effect of board
structures on executive pay are generally limited and
therefore, this offers a fertile area for further research.
For example, Guest (2009), Main (1991) and Ozkan
(2007) report that firms with larger boards in the UK
pay their CEOs higher than their counterparts with
smaller boards. In terms of board diversity, the empirical
evidence of prior studies suggests that board gender
and ethnic diversity can enhance board independence
and effectiveness by increasing monitoring on the
opportunistic behaviours of management. For example,
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gregory-Smith et al.
(2014) find a negative association between board gender
diversity and CEO pay for US and UK firms,
respectively. Therefore, our second hypothesis to be
tested is that:
Hypothesis 2. There is an association between board
structure and executive pay.
CEO power and executive pay
CEO power is considered to be an important element that
can influence board effectiveness (Bebchuk et al., 2011;
Tian and Yang, 2014). Managerial power hypothesis
suggests that firms with powerful CEOs, represented by
high CEOs pay slice, long-tenure and role duality, tend
to pay their executives more than necessary compared
with firms with less powerful CEOs (Conyon and He,
2012). Specficially, and from managerial power
hypothesis, CEO tenure is considered harmful, and this
can be explained by the view that long-tenured CEOs tend
to develop strong relationships with other board members
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Ozkan, 2011), which can increase
their power and influence over board strategic decision
(i.e., pay setting process). Similarly, optimal contracting
theory suggests that long-tenured CEOs usually tend to
have greater external networks, skills and experience,
which firms need to be successful, and this consequently
may lead to awarding high pay packages to long-tenured
CEOs in order to maintain them (Ntim et al., 2017).
With respect to CEO duality, managerial power
hypothesis indicates that combining CEO and chairperson
roles can diminish board independence and effectiveness
by granting more power to CEOs, and that can increase
CEOs influence over strategic decisions, including those
relating to executive pay (Jensen, 1993; Conyon and He,
2011). Similarly, optimal contracting theory suggests that
separating CEO and chairperson roles can reduce CEO
power by increasing monitoring over the opportunistic
behaviours of management (Conyon, 1997; Core et al.,
1999), which can have positive impact on the pay setting
process. Further, and in terms of CEO pay slice,
managerial power and optimal contracting theories
suggest that the concentration of power in CEOs can
reduce the monitoring role of the board on executives,
which can offer opportunities for CEOs to award
themselves with overly generous pay packages (Bebchuk
et al., 2011; Tian and Yang, 2014). As poor governance is
associated with the concentration of power in CEOs, it can
be expected that powerful CEOs are more likely to receive
larger slice of the total pay awarded to executives than less
powerful CEOs.
The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the
prediction that CEO power can reduce board
independence and effectiveness, which may allow CEOs
to reward themselves with overly generous pay packages
(e.g., Conyon et al., 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010;
Bebchuk et al., 2011; Tian and Yang, 2014). For example,
using 390 UK listed firms from 1999 to 2005, Ozkan
(2011) reports that long-tenured CEOs tend to receive
higher pay than short-tenured CEOs. Renneboog and
Zhao (2011), Conyon and He (2012) and Ntim et al.
(2015a), for instance, have reported similar findings for
samples of British, Chinese, and South African listed
firms, respectively. With respect to CEO duality, Brick
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et al. (2006) report a higher CEO pay for firms, which
combined CEO and chairperson positions than those,
which separated these two positions. Similarly, Core
et al. (1999) reported similar findings for sample of US
firms. However, Conyon (1997) and Renneboog and Zhao
(2011) report no association between CEO duality and
CEO pay for a sample of UK listed firms. With reference
to CEO pay slice, studies examining its influence on
executive pay are rare, and thus this study constitutes a
timely contribution to the extant literature. Tian and Yang
(2014) find a positive and significant association between
CEO play slice and CEO pay for a sample of 179 US
financial institutions. Hence, our third hypothesis to be
tested is:
Hypothesis 3. There is an association between CEO
power and executive pay.
Ownership structure and executive pay
Managerial power hypothesis suggests that firms with
concentrated ownership structure may suffer from agency
problems that arise from the conflict of interest problems
between majority and minority shareholders. Conyon
and He (2011, 2012), and Wang and Xiao (2011) suggest
that block shareholders may connive with executives to
maximise their own interests at the expense of minority
of shareholders, and this can empower executives to pay
themselves excessively high. Alternatively, optimal
contracting theory suggests that ownership concentration
can enhance monitoring on management activities by
acting as alternative governance mechanism that can
restrain the influence of managers over the decisions made
by the board, and thereby allowing the board to design pay
packages that are closely aligned with executive
performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).
With reference to institutional ownership, optimal
contracting theory indicates that institutional owners, as
powerful stakeholders, have more incentives to monitor
the opportunistic behaviours of management (Ntim
et al., 2017), and this is due to the fact that institutional
shareholders tend to have large equity stakes in listed
firms (Jafarinejad et al., 2015). Institutional shareholders
also enjoy various advantages over their individual or less
informed counterparts, including information, knowledge
and skills (Ntim et al., 2015a). These advantages can
allow institutional shareholders to exert more influence
on a number of board decisions, including determining
the appropriate level of executive pay. From managerial
power hypothesis, institutional shareholders may not play
active role in monitoring and preventing management
from expropriating shareholders’wealth, since they might
be more interested in maximising their own liquidity and
short-term profits (Ntim et al., 2015a). Consequently, this
can offer managers opportunities to maximise their own
utility by paying themselves excessively high at the
expense of shareholders. In terms of managerial
ownership, and from managerial power hypothesis
perspective, higher managerial ownership can diminish
board monitoring and effectiveness, because it can grant
more power to managers over their own pay (Morck
et al., 1988; Cyert et al., 2002). Alternatively, optimal
contracting theory suggests that managerial ownership
can help in aligning managers and shareholders’ interests
by increasing managerial monitoring and preventing
executives from expropriating shareholders’ wealth
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Consequently, this can reduce the influence of executives
over the level and structure of their pay.
The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the
view that concentrated ownership can mitigate agency
problems through allowing block shareholders to set
executive pay in such a way that aligns executives’
interest with those of shareholders (e.g., Hartzell and
Starks, 2003; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Conyon and He,
2011). For example, Conyon and He (2011) and Sapp
(2008) report a negative relationship between block
ownership structure and CEO pay using a sample of
Chinese and Canadian listed firms, respectively. With
reference to institutional ownership, the findings of prior
studies are mixed. For example, and consistent with the
results of previous studies (e.g., Sapp, 2008), Dong and
Ozkan (2008) and Ozkan (2007, 2011) report a negative
relationship between institutional ownership and CEO
pay using a sample of UK listed firms. By contrast, Cosh
and Hughes (1997) find no association between
institutional ownership and CEO pay for a sample of
UK firms. However, many of the UK governance reforms
(i.e., from 1992 Cadbury Report to 2016 Combined Code)
are underpinned by an expectation that institutional
shareholders will play an active role in improving
governance practices, including restraining executive
pay. Additionally, prior evidence on the link between
director ownership and executive pay is largely in line
with the view that higher director ownership can help in
mitigating agency problems (including preventing
executives from rewarding themselves with overly
generous pay packages) by aligning managers and
shareholders’ interests (Morck et al., 1988; Ozkan,
2007). For example, and consistent with the results of
previous studies (e.g., Ozkan, 2007; Dong and Ozkan,
2008; Choe et al., 2014), Tian and Yang (2014) report a
negative relationship between the level of share ownership
by CEOs and their pay. Therefore, and given the
widespread nature of share ownership in the UK (Mallin
et al., 2015), our fourth hypothesis to be tested is that:
Hypothesis 4. There is an association between
ownership structure and executive pay.
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Executive pay and performance (pay-for-performance
sensitivity – PPS)
The separation of ownership from control in modern firms
has been suggested to be one of the main drivers for
agency conflicts in modern corporations (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), as rational managers may be motivated
by their self-interests, and as such they may not
necessarily act in the shareholders’ best interests. As a
result, different governance mechanisms have been
suggested that may be able to encourage managers to act
in the shareholders’ best interests (Fama, 1980; Fama
and Jensen, 1983). In this case, executive pay has been
suggested to be one of the most effective corporate
governance mechanisms that can help in aligning
management and shareholders’ interests (Beatty and
Zajac, 1994), and this is the central driver for a number
of recent UK corporate governance reforms, including
those contained in the 1995 Greenbury Report, the
2002 Director Remuneration Report and the 2016
Combined Code.
A considerable number of existing corporate
governance studies have, therefore, investigated the link
between executive pay and performance (pay-for-
performance sensitivity – PPS) (e.g., Core et al., 1999,
2003 ; Bebchuk et al., 2011 ; Amzaleg et al., 2014). Prior
empirical literature generally finds a positive, but weak
PPS (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996;
Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999; Cheng and Firth, 2005;
Schultz et al., 2013; Amzaleg et al., 2014; van Essen
et al., 2015). For instance, Main et al. (1996) reports a
positive, but weak link between CEO pay and
performance for a sample of UK firms. Therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive link between
executive pay and performance (PPS).
The moderating effect of corporate governance on the
PPS
A major limitation of past studies examining executive
pay–performance nexus is that they fail to control for
corporate governance mechanisms that may influence
the PPS. Therefore, and to overcome these limitations, a
number of studies in the US (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dong,
2014; Newton, 2015) and UK (e.g., Ozkan, 2007, 2011)
have controlled for a comprehensive number of corporate
governance variables (e.g., board and ownership
mechanisms), when examining the PPS. In spite of
controlling for a large number of corporate governance
variables, many studies have reported weak PPS,
implying that the findings of these studies largely lend
support to the predictions of the managerial power
hypothesis. A major weakness of existing literature is that
they have only investigated the PPS for CEOs without
considering other executive directors, such as CFOs.
Additionally, these studies do not take into account
possible endogeneity concerns that may result from
simultaneously using both corporate governance (as
monitoring mechanism) and executive pay (as alignment
mechanism of interests) by corporations to mitigate
agency problems (Ntim et al., 2015a,2015b). These
limitations may help to explain the weak PPS that have
been generally reported by past studies (Cho et al., 2014;
Conyon and He, 2011, 2012). However, and as monitoring
(corporate governance) and incentive alignment (exe-
cutive pay) mechanisms are often employed together by
firms in order to resolve agency problems, they may need
to be interrelated or interdepended in order to be efficient
in practice (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b).
One way of taking such potential interdependencies/
simultaneities into account and thus, improve the PPS, is
to conduct regressions containing interaction terms among
our performance (e.g., TSR), incentive (executive pay) and
monitoring (corporate governance quality) mechanisms.
For example, good corporate governance may increase
monitoring on the opportunistic behaviour of mana-
gement and that can improve the PPS. Thus, we
hypothesise that firm-level corporate governance may
interact with performance and executive pay in order
to improve the PPS. Thus, our final hypothesis to be
tested is:
Hypothesis 6. Corporate governance moderates the
association between executive pay and performance,
with the PPS being stronger in firms with good
corporate governance mechanisms.
Research design
Data considerations
Four criteria were set to select the final sample: (i) the
annual reports of the listed companies need to be
available/accessible for the years from 2008 to 2013; (ii)
a firm’s financial and corporate governance data must be
available for all years from 2008 to 2013; (iii) availability
of executive pay data for years from 2008 to 2013; and
(iv) continuity of listing on the London Stock Exchange
over the six years investigated. A number of reasons
underlined the application of these criteria. First, we limit
our sample to firms with consecutive-years data available,
because corporate governance and executive pay data
were manually collected, which was highly labour
intensive activity (Ntim et al., 2013), and thereby serving
as a limiting factor in terms of the amount firms/annual
reports from which the required data could be collected
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from. Second, and in line with past corporate governance
studies (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b),
these criteria helped us to satisfy the requirement of a
balanced panel analysis. Third, combining time-series
and cross-sectional data can help in ascertaining whether
any cross-sectional relationship among corporate
governance mechanisms, executive pay, and performance
holds over time. Fourth, the 2008 financial year was
the first year when we started data collection because
the financial crisis of 2007/08 has increased debate
surrounding the effectiveness and the role of corporate
governance in preventing managers from expropriating
shareholders’ wealth. The 2013 financial year was the last
year for which data was available at the time of collecting
the data.
A number of procedures have been followed in
selecting our final sample. As at December 2013, a total
of 1,297 firms were listed on the main board of the
London Stock Exchange. First, we excluded 685 firms
operating in the financial and utility industries, leaving
us with 612 (non-financial) listed firms during the
2008–2013 period. The financial and utilities were
excluded for the following two reasons: (i) they have
different capital structure and also different regulations
(Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012); and (ii) to facilitate
comparisons with the results of prior studies (e.g., Ozkan,
2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Mallin et al., 2015; Melis et al.,
2015), who also excluded financial and utilities from their
sample. Second, we excluded 319 companies with
missing annual reports/data/listed recently, leaving us with
293 companies with full data.
The classification of the remaining 293 companies is as
follows: basic-materials consisted of 27 (9%) companies;
consumer-goods consisted of 36 (13%) companies;
consumer-services consisted of 68 (23%) companies;
healthcare consisted of 15 (5%) companies; industrials
consisted of 102 (35%) companies; oil and gas consisted
of 18 (6%) companies; technology consisted of 22
(7%) companies; and telecommunications consisted
of five (2%) companies. Third, because the number
of observations from healthcare, oil and gas, and
telecommunications industries was relatively small, the
observations from these three industries were added to
the basic-materials, consumer-services, and technology
industries. In particular, corporations operating in the oil
and gas industry were included in the basic-materials
industry; corporations operating in the healthcare industry
were added to the consumer-services industry, while
corporations operating in the telecommunication industry
were added to the technology industry. Finally, due to
collecting the required data manually, which was a highly
labour intensive activity, coupledwith the extensive nature
of the corporate governance, executive pay, board,
ownership, and financial data required, we restricted our
final balanced sample to 100 companies from 2008 to
2013 (i.e., resulting in a sample of 600 company-year
observations), which were stratify sampled using both
firm size and industry type. The selection of our final
sample was particularly based on the ranking of the largest
10 companies and the smallest 10 companies (i.e., 20
companies from each of the main five industries) in each
industry using market capitalisation (see Table 1 for
detailed information about sample selection procedure).
We collected our data from two main sources. First, the
corporate governance, board characteristics, ownership
mechanisms and executive pay data were collected
manually from the annual reports of the examined sample.
Those reports were downloaded from companies’
websites and the Perfect Information database, whereas
DataStream was used to collect the financial data. Unlike
Table 1 Sample selection procedures
Panel A: classification of non-financial
listed firms on the LSE as of 31/12/2013
Number of firms
from each industry
Basic materials 72
Consumer goods 76
Consumer series 131
Technology 44
Industrials 179
Healthcare 28
Communication 26
Oil and gas 56
Firms available for
sampling
612
Less: Firms with no
annual reports
66
Firms listed recently
(2008–2013)
125
Firms with some annual
reports missing
128 319
Firms with full data 293
Panel B: classification
of non-financial listed
firms with full data
Number of firms
from each industry
Basic materials 27
Consumer goods 36
Consumer series 68
Technology 22
Industrials 102
Healthcare 15
Communication 5
Oil and gas 18
Firms with full data 293
Panel C: the final
selected sample
Number of firms
from each industry
Final stratified
sample
Basic materials and
oil and gas
45 20
Consumer goods 36 20
Consumer series
and healthcare
83 20
Industrials 102 20
Technology and
communication
27 20
293 100
LSE, London Stock Exchange.
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most past studies that focused only on the pay package of
CEOs (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Conyon and He, 2011,
2012; Ozkan, 2011; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; van
Essen et al., 2015), we collected data on both cash and
non-cash pay relating to CEOs, CFOs and all other
executives. Second, we collected data on financial and
accounting variable from DataStream.
Definition of variables and model specification
Table 2 presents summary definitions of the dependent,
explanatory, interaction and control variables employed
in this study. To test H1 to H4 (i.e., to answer our central
research question: the effect of corporate governance on
executive pay), we use three main types of variables, as
follows.
Dependent variable (executive pay)
Following prior studies (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011, 2012;
Ntim et al., 2015a), total pay of the CEOs, the CFOs and
all other executive directors, are our main dependent
variable. Similarly, and following well established studies
(e.g., Ozkan, 2011; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Choe
et al., 2014), CEO pay or CFO pay is defined as the
natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and
other reported cash remuneration) and total non-cash
(i.e., performance share plan and any other reported
long-term incentive plans) pay in a financial year.
Additionally and in line with Ntim et al. (2015a, 2017)
and Schaefer (1998), all other executive directors’ pay is
defined as the natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus,
salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total
non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other
reported long-term incentive plans) pay of all executive
directors scaled by the total number of executive directors
in a financial year.
Independent variables
Our main independent variables are corporate governance
mechanisms, which aremeasured by using a: (i) broad UK
corporate disclosure index (CGI); (ii) board structure
variables (BSE and BD); (iii) CEO power variables
(CEOT, DSPLIT and CEOS); and (iv) ownership
mechanisms (MANO, ISTO and BLKO). With reference
to the CGI, it has been developed based on the definition
Table 2 Summary definition of variables
Variables Definition
CEOP Natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total
non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CEOs.
CFOP Natural log of annual cash (i.e. cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total
non-cash (i.e. performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CFOs.
AEDP Natural log of annual cash (i.e. cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total
non-cash (i.e. performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of AEDs scaled
by the total number of executive directors. To account for potential size effects, we run median regressions.
TSR Total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing share price minus opening share price
divided by opening share price) and dividend yield (dividend per share divided by opening share price).
Q Book value of total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets.
ROA Operating profit divided by total assets.
CGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the CG Code of 2010.
Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value of 1 if disclosure is made in firms’ accounts/
reports and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging from 100% to 0%. Principal component analysis
is then applied to obtain 31 key components out of the 120 individual corporate governance provisions.
P*CGI Interaction variable between performance (i.e., TSR or Q or ROA) and CGI.
BSE Natural log of the number of inside and outside executives on a corporate board.
BD Percentage of ethnic minorities and females on a corporate board.
DSPLIT 1 if CEO and chairperson positions are separated, 0 otherwise.
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within a firm.
CEOS Total CEO pay scaled by total of all other executive directors’ pay.
MANO Proportion of all directors’ ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings.
ISTO Proportion of institutional ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings.
BLKO Proportion of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings).
AFS 1, if a company is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche,
Ernst and Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise.
LTA Natural log of book total assets.
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets.
RIS Total research and development expenditure scaled by total assets.
SG Percentage of the sales of this year minus the sales of previous year to the sales of the previous year.
CL Takes 1 if a firm is listed in a foreign market, 0 otherwise.
IDU Dummy variables for each of the five main industries.
YDU Dummy variables for the years 2008–2013.
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provided by the UK corporate governance codes.
Specifically, Cadbury Report (1992) and FRC (2010a,
2010b; 2012a, 2012b) define good corporate governance
to be underpinned by principles of accountability, fairness,
independence, integrity, openness, responsibility, social
responsibility and transparency. In this paper, we follow
the UK Combined Code in defining the five main pillars
of good corporate governance as: displaying strong: (i)
leadership; maintaining strong board; (ii) effectiveness;
maintaining high corporate; (iii) accountability; applying
fair and transparent; (iv) remuneration practices; and
maintaining good (v) relations with shareholders.
Additionally, and following well-established literature
(Gompers et al., 2003; Larcker et al., 2007; Bebchuk
et al., 2009; Karpoff et al., 2016), we operationalise the
concept of good corporate governance by measuring the
presence or absence of 120 individual corporate
governance items3 based on the 2012 UK Combined
Code, with firms receiving higher scores considered to
be better-governed (i.e., good/strong governance) and vice
versa (i.e., poor/weak governance). Appendix 1 presents
the definitions of all the corporate governance disclosure
provisions included in the CGI.
Corporate governance disclosure index coding process
For transparency and replicability purposes, in this
section, we describe in detail the process of coding our
index. We constructed our CGI in a way that allows us
to capture the qualitative differences in governance
disclosures among different firms. With the issue of the
quality of the governance mechanisms in mind when
designing our governance index, we inherently designed
in a way that it naturally measures quality of the
governance mechanisms rather than their mere disclosure
in the annual reports. This quality approach mainly
explains the relatively large number of items that we
have in our index. For example, our index is designed
in such a way that it avoids box-ticking by including a
comprehensive list of items (i.e., 120 corporate
governance provisions) compared with those of prior
studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al.,
2009). Consequently, this allows us to measure the
qualitative differences in corporate governance dis-
closures across firms. For instance and if we take the
quality of board committees, such as audit committee,
rather than just measuring their mere presence by simply
adding 1 if a company has an audit committee, otherwise
0, our index carefully attempts to measure the quality of
the audit committee by investigating further whether
the audit committee is also chaired by an independent
non-executive director, whether it has been formed
entirely by independent non-executive directors, whether
it has members with financial expertise, whether the
membership has been clearly disclosed, whether it
organises regular meetings, and whether the members
attendance record of such meetings is disclosed, among
others. Similarly, with respect to the board structures, a
value of 1 is given to a firm if the chairperson of its board
is an independent non-executive director. Additional one
point is added if the roles of the board chairperson and
CEO are separated. Another one point is added if the
majority of the board members are independent non-
executive directors, among others. Therefore, this detailed
approach allows us to clearly distinguish firms with good
governance mechanisms in place from those with poor
governance mechanisms, and thereby helping us to
measure compliance with the ‘spirit’ rather than just the
‘letter’ of the UK corporate governance codes. Therefore,
and following this widely employed binary (unweighted)
coding scheme, a firm’s overall score of corporate
governance disclosure may range between 0 and 120,
which is then expressed as a percentage ranging from
0% (poor corporate governance disclosure index quality)
to 100% (perfect corporate governance disclosure index
quality) with higher compliance with the 2012 UK
Combined Code.
Although the unweighted scoring scheme has been
criticised for not reflecting the relative importance
associated with different corporate governance disclosure
provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2004),
we adopt this approach for the following reasons. First,
unlike the ordinal (weighted) scoring scheme, the
unweighted scoring scheme helps in enhancing the
reliability and objectivity of our index, because it does
not require making judgements in relation to the specific
weight that needs to be given to different corporate
governance disclosure provisions (Owusu-Ansah, 1998;
Gompers et al., 2003). Second, there is no agreed
theoretical framework to accurately assign weights to
different corporate governance provisions, and thus our
decision to use an unweighted scoring scheme may limit
the possibility that our index is biased towards any single
or specific corporate governance provision, as is often the
case with binary scoring scheme (Owusu-Ansah, 1998).
Third, existing studies indicate that both the unweighted
and weighted scoring schemes provide similar results
(e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Barako et al., 2006).
Finally, the use of an unweighted coding scheme is based
on a well-established theoretical and empirical literature
(e.g., Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015; Ntim
et al., 2015a), and hence, this may allow us to compare
our findings with the results of past similar studies.
The content analysis for this study was performed by a
single coder. However, to ensure the reliability, validity
3These 120 governance provisions were mainly extracted from the 2012 UK
Combined Code. We also relied on other sources, such as the 2006 Companies
Act, the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules, Disclosure and Transparency
Rules, and Insider Trading Law, in determining the final governance provisions
included in our index.
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and consistency of the coding framework, in the first
round of coding, an initial sample of 10 companies
(2 companies from each of the main five industries) over
the period 2008–2013 were coded. Coding categories and
coded materials were critically discussed with two
experienced coders, and then in the second round, any
mistakes or inconsistencies identified independently by
the two coders in the first round were discussed and
corrected. A further 10 firms were coded, but the two
experienced coders independently did not identify any
further mistakes or inconsistencies with the coding
procedure. This ensured near perfect correlation between
the first and second stage coding and thus, high levels of
consistency, reliability, and validity were achieved.
Additionally, and to examine the reliability of the
constructed index, the current study used Cronbach’s
alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the five
categories contained in the CGI is 0.861, indicating
further that the corporate governance disclosure index
employed in this study is a reliable and valid con-
struct for corporate governance quality (Allegrini and
Greco, 2013).
Principal component analysis
Although great efforts have been made to improve the
validity and reliability of our index, existing literature
suggests that not all of the 120 governance provisions
included in our index may contribute to the observed
effect of the CGI on executive pay, because some
provisions may have significant explanatory power, while
others may be less relevant or have less importance in
terms of measuring corporate governance (Brown and
Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009). To identify the most
relevant corporate governance provisions that contribute
to the observed effect of the governance disclosure index
and following existing literature (e.g., Larcker et al.,
2007; Hoppe and Moers, 2011; Black et al., 2017;
Karpoff et al., 2016), we use principal component
analysis.
Principal component analysis is a commonly used
statistical method to reduce the number of predictor
variables (i.e., corporate governance provisions) and
determine variables that explain most of the variance
(Larcker et al., 2007). Therefore, and in order to identify
the underlying components of our CGI and determine
which corporate governance provisions are associated
with each component, we follow Black et al. (2017),
Larcker et al. (2007) and Karpoff et al. (2016) by
employing principal component analysis. We run the
principal component analysis for each of our five sub-
indices and we retained components with eigenvalues
greater than one. This resulted in retaining 31 components
that accounted for 68.04% of the total variance in our
original data (see Appendix 2). Additionally and
following Larcker et al. (2007), we retain all corporate
governance provisions with loading values exceeding
0.40. This resulted in excluding four provisions, which
are 19 (0.381), 21 (0.327), 97 (0.309) and 98 (0.320).
Appendix 2 also shows that provisions 4, 5, 3 and 7 are
loaded most strongly on the first principal component.
The loading values of all of these four corporate
governance provisions are above 0.40, and thus we
retained all of these provisions. Similarly, and as shown
in Appendix 2, the loading of provisions 2 and 6 are above
0.40, indicating that these provisions are loaded most
strongly on the second principal component, and hence
we retained these two provisions. We used this general
approach (i.e., loading values that exceed 0.40) to
determine the other corporate governance provisions that
we finally retain.
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and
percentage of variation explained by each of the 31
components. The mean value for the 31 components
ranges between 0.979 and 0.007, indicating that there is
adequate variation in the CGI.
Control variables
Additionally, previous studies suggest that the level of
executive pay can be influenced by firm characteristics,
such as firm size (Newton, 2015); size of auditing firm
(Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2015a), capital
expenditure (Ntim et al., 2015a); sales growth (Conyon
and He, 2011, 2012); cross-listing (Fahlenbrach, 2009);
and time and industry differences (Main et al., 1996).
Therefore, we controlled for firm-level (i.e., firm size,
audit firm size, capital expenditure, sales growth, cross-
listing, industry and year dummies) characteristics in this
study.
To address the first research question (i.e., whether
firm-level corporate governance disclosure impacts on
executive pay (H1–H4)), the following models are
proposed and tested using the ordinary least square
(OLS) regression technique initially:
PAYit ¼ α0 þ β1CGIit þ ∑
8
i¼1
βiCONTSit þ εit (1)
PAYit ¼ α0 þ β1BSEit þ β2BDit þ β3CEOTit
þβ4DSPLITit þ β5CEOSit þ β6MANOit
þβ7ISTOit þ β8BLKOit∑
8
i¼1
βiCONTSit þ εit
(2)
where: PAY is the main predicted variable that is measured
using CEO (CEOP), CFO (CFOP) and all executive
directors (AEDP) pay; CGI (corporate governance index),
BSE (board size), BD (board diversity), CEOT (CEO
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tenure), DSPLIT (CEO–board chairperson role split),
CEOS (CEO pay slice), MANO (managerial ownership),
ISTO (institutional ownership) and BLKO (block
ownership) are our main independent variables; and
CONTS refers to the set of variables being controlled for,
namely, firm size (LTA), audit firm size (AFS), capital
expenditure (CEX), risk taking (RIS), sales growth (SG),
cross-listing (CL), industry (IDU) and year (YDU)
dummies.
To test H5 and H6 (i.e., to answer our supplementary
research question: the PPS and whether corporate
governance on can moderate the PPS), we divided the
study’s variables into five groups. First, our main
dependent variable is total pay of the CEOs, the CFOs
and all other executive directors. Executive pay (CEO,
CFO, or all other executive directors) is broadly defined
to include both cash and non-cash pay. Second, our main
independent variable is firm performance, as measured
by total shareholder return (TSR), which is consistent with
Gregory-Smith (2012) and Ntim et al. (2015b, 2017).
Third, we control for a number of variables that may affect
executive pay, including board structure (BSE and BD),
CEO power (CEOT, DSPLIT and CEOS), ownership
structure (MANO, ISTO and BLKO), and firm
characteristics, such as firm size (LTA), audit firm size
(AFS), capital expenditure (CEX), risk taking (RIS), sales
growth (SG), cross-listing (CL), industries (IDU) and year
(YDU) dummies. Assuming that all the hypothesised
relationships are linear, our initial OLS regression model
to specifically test H5 (i.e., the PPS) is structured as
follows:
PAYit ¼ a0 þ βiTSRit þ ∑
8
i¼1
βiCONTSit þ εit; (3)
where: PAY is the main dependent variable; TSR is our
main independent variable; and CONTS refers to control
variables, including BSE, BD, CEOT, DSPLIT, CEOS,
MANO, ISTO, BLOK, LTA, AFS, CEX, RIS, SG, CL,
IDU and YDU. As a robustness check, we also employ
tobin’s (Q) and return on assets (ROA), as alterative
market- and accounting-based measures, respectively.
Fourth, and to specifically examine H6 (whether
corporate governance disclosure index can moderate the
PPS), we create an interaction variable by multiplying
the firm-level corporate governance disclosure index and
performance as follows: CGI times TSR or Q or ROA
(P*CGI). Finally, we control for the same variables
included in the third model in estimating our final model,
which is as follows:
PAYit ¼ a0 þ β1TSRit þ ∑
1
j¼1
βjCGIit þ ∑
1
k¼1
βkINTit
þ ∑
8
i¼1
βiCONTSit þ εit;
(4)
where TSR refers to total shareholder return; CGI refers to
the corporate governance disclosure index; and INT refers
to their respective interaction variable, namely P*CGI;
andCONTS remains the same as specified in equation (3).
Table 3 Summary statistics and percentage of variation explained by each
of 31 components of the CGI
Component Percent Explained SD Mean Median
Leadership sub-index’s components
C1 31.08 0.24 0.89 1.00
C2 15.85 0.31 0.65 0.50
C3 14.25 0.25 0.25 0.50
Effectiveness sub-index’s components
C4 16.56 0.37 0.67 0.89
C5 11.41 0.30 0.84 1.00
C6 6.92 0.22 0.10 0.00
C7 6.71 0.21 0.92 1.00
C8 6.07 0.37 0.61 0.67
C9 5.32 0.33 0.35 0.33
C10 5.29 0.084 0.007 0.00
C11 5.16 0.17 0.96 1.00
C12 4.15 0.34 0.43 0.50
C13 4.04 0.30 0.028 0.00
Accountability sub-index’s components
C14 14.65 0.13 0.019 0.00
C15 10.29 0.31 0.56 0.63
C16 8.24 0.19 0.94 1.00
C17 8.14 0.25 0.14 0.25
C18 7.64 0.11 0.98 1.00
C19 7.42 0.14 0.030 0.00
C20 6.54 0.38 0.81 1.00
C21 5.83 0.23 0.82 1.00
C22 3.62 0.22 0.047 0.00
Remuneration sub-index’s components
C23 21.87 0.12 0.98 1.00
C24 16.25 0.29 0.87 1.00
C25 13.04 0.26 0.77 0.80
C26 9.95 0.32 0.82 1.00
C27 9.45 0.20 0.040 0.00
Relations with Shareholders sub-index’s components
C28 26.39 0.35 0.24 0.00
C29 18.26 0.33 0.72 0.80
C30 11.30 0.29 0.75 0.75
C31 8.46 0.25 0.89 1.00
Principal component analysis is conducted for our five sub-indices in order
to identify the most relevant corporate governance provisions that
contribute to the observed effect of the governance index, where we
retain all components with an eigenvalue greater than one. We also retain
all corporate governance provisions with loading values exceeding 0.40.
This resulted in retaining 31 components that account for 68.04% of the
total variance in our original data. To compute the score of our index, we
use the average equal-weighted sum of the corporate governance
provisions associated with each component, with the exception of
components number 3, 13, 17 and 22, which have substitute provisions.
The provisions of these components are calculated as follows to reflect
the substitutability: the component 3 is calculated as the sum of the roles
of the board and management less board membership, divided by two.
Component number 13 is computed as the sum of frequency of
nomination committee (NC) meetings and board composition minus
access to free independent legal advice, divided by three. The same
approach is followed to compute the remaining two components.
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Empirical findings
Descriptive analysis and bivariate correlation analyses
The statistical summary of the pay of the CEO, CFO and
all other executive directors is reported in Panels A-C in
Table 4 over the 6-year period investigated (2008–2013).
The panels suggest that the distribution of the total pay
of CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors varies
substantially. For example, all other executive directors
pay has a mean (median) of £7.49 million (£2.46 million)
and ranges from £0.065 million to £105.58 million.
Similarly, the distribution of the total pay of CEOs or
CFOs shows similar pattern. The average CEO pay, for
example, is £3.49 million, with a minimum value of
£0.020 million and a maximum value of £61.44 million.
Table 4 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Panel A: CEO pay (£m)
CEO_salary 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.0009 2.12
CEO_bonus 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.0006 3.65
CEO_cash 1.57 0.68 3.07 0.020 36.65
CEO_non-cash 1.98 0.46 3.73 0.003 29.92
Total CEO pay (CEOP) 3.55 1.14 6.15 0.020 61.44
Panel B: CFO pay (£m)
CFO_salary 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.015 1.82
CFO_bonus 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.005 1.85
CFO_cash 0.81 0.56 0.82 0.017 7.07
CFO_non-cash 0.95 0.38 1.44 0.0009 12.31
Total CFO pay (CFOP) 1.76 0.94 2.04 0.029 15.28
Panel C: All other executive directors pay (£m)
AED_salary 1.36 0.92 1.21 0.003 9.80
ADE_bonus 1.56 0.94 1.90 0.002 13.66
AED_cash 3.50 1.66 5.44 0.065 58.85
AED_non-cash 4.03 1.08 6.59 0.011 46.73
Total AED pay (AEDP) 7.53 2.74 11.19 0.065 105.58
Panel D: firm performance variables
TSR 0.086 0.039 0.396 0.605 0.916
Q 0.54 0.56 0.24 0.014 1.66
ROA 0.086 0.077 0.097 0.137 0.299
Panel E: corporate governance disclosure index
CGI % 52.42 54.69 12.49 17.00 81.00
Panel F: board characteristics (control variables)
BSE 9.00 8.00 3.46 3.00 18.00
BD % 11.65 11.11 11.40 0.00 50.00
Panel G: CEO Power (control variables)
DSPLIT % 90.33 100.00 29.57 0.00 100.00
CEOT 5.54 4.00 5.21 0.00 35.00
CEOS 0.48 0.476 0.18 0.08 1.00
Panel H: ownership structure (control variables)
MANO % 5.95 0.58 11.40 0.005 52.37
ISTO % 38.38 36.38 20.70 3.07 97.49
BLKO% 42.62 43.20 21.55 3.07 98.08
Panel I: firm-characteristics (control variables)
AFS % 82.00 100.00 38.45 0.00 100.00
TA (£m) 177,43.64 431.25 418,59.28 0.983 274,507.71
CEX % 4.99 3.70 4.14 0.42 14.73
RIS 0.07 0.024 0.14 0.00 1.24
SG% 7.61 5.65 18.60 23.77 52.04
CL % 70.00 100.00 45.86 0.00 100.00
The table reports summary descriptive statistics relating to annual cash-based (bonus, salary, and other cash payments) and equity-based (i.e., performance
share plan and any other LTIPs) pay for CEOs, CFOs, and all other executive directors (AEDs) in Panels A-C. The descriptive statistic for alterative
accounting (ROA) and market-based (TSR and Q) measures for corporate performance provided in Panel D. Additionally, descriptive statistics for
corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) are provided in Panel E. Finally, Panels F, G and H provide the descriptive statistics for control variables
as follows: Panel F presents the statistical summary of board mechanisms, namely board size (BSE), board gender and ethnic diversity (BD), separation
of CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT), CEO tenure (CEOT), and CEO slice (CEOS); Panel G shows the descriptive statistics for ownership
variables, namely managerial ownership (MANO), institutional ownership (ISTO) and block ownership (BLKO), while Panel H provides the descriptive
statistics of firm characteristics including audit firm size (AFS), firm size (TA), capital expenditure (CEX), risk taking (RIS), sales growth (SG) and cross-
listing (CL).
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Additionally, Table 4 shows that the average CEO pay is
relatively higher compared with the average pay of other
executive directors. Particularly and on average, CEOs
seem to receive about £1.79 million (£3.55 million–
£1.76 million) more in total pay than the CFOs. This
suggests that CEOs continue to receive relatively higher
pay compared with other executive directors, and that
lends support for the findings of past UK studies (e.g.,
Main et al., 1996; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Ozkan,
2011). Crucially, and supporting the recommendations
of the 2010 corporate governance code that a large
proportion of executive pay should be non-cash-based
in order to align management and shareholders’ interests,
total non-cash-based pay forms a large proportion of total
executive pay among the UK sampled firms. Specifically,
the mean value of total non-cash-based pay of all other
executive directors (AEDs_non-cash) of £4.03 million is
higher, and it is about 54% of the mean value of total
pay (all other executive directors pay) of £7.53 million,
while the mean value of total cash pay of all other
executive directors (AEDs_cash) of £3.50 million is only
46% of the mean value of total pay (all other executive
directors pay) of £7.53 million. The evidence that
executives are paid higher non-cash-based remuneration
compared with cash-based remuneration is largely
consistent with those reported by past US studies (e.g.,
Cyert et al., 2002; Dong, 2014).
Further, Panels D-H of Table 4 present summary
descriptive statistics relating to the corporate performance,
corporate governance and control variables, respectively.
Overall, these panels show wide spread for all variables
under examination. For instance, and similar to the results
of past corporate governance studies (e.g., Gregory-
Smith, 2012), TSR ranges from 0.60 to 0.91 with an
average (a median) of 0.086 (0.03), suggesting that
our sampled firms are, on average, profitable. The
corporate governance disclosure index (CGI) also varies
substantially, ranging from 17% to 81% with the mean
(median) companies complying with 52% (64%) of the
120 governance provisions investigated. The mean board
size of 8 is consistent with that reported by Ozkan (2011).
The mean institutional ownership of 38% is close to the
30% found by Dong and Ozkan (2008) for a sample of
UK firms. The average 11% of board diversity suggests
that, on average, the boards of UK listed firms are
dominated by white males. With reference to the other
remaining variables, all show wide variation, indicating
that the sample is sufficiently made up of a mixture of
small and large firms, and thereby minimising any
possibilities of sample selection bias.
The correlation coefficients of both Pearson and
Spearman are reported in Table 5 in order to identify the
presence of any potential multicollinearity problems.
The direction and magnitude of both correlation matrices
are relatively similar, indicating that any remaining
non-normalities in the variables employed are not likely
to be serious to violate the assumptions of OLS regression
(Ntim et al., 2015b). Additionally, the correlation
coefficients of Spearman and Pearson are relatively low
and the values of the variance inflation factor (VIF)
reported in Tables 7 and 8 also do not exceed 10,
indicating that there are no serious multicollinearity
problems (Field, 2009).
Overall and focusing on the Pearson’s parametric
correlation coefficients, Table 5 indicates statistically
strong associations among the executive pay (CEOs,
CFOs, or all other executive directors), corporate
governance, performance and control variables. For
example, the findings suggest that companies with
larger portions of managerial ownership, institutional
ownership, and block ownership pay significantly lower
remuneration to their CEOs, CFOs and all other executive
directors. Additionally, there is a discernible evidence that
cross-listed (CL), larger (LTA), capital intensive (CEX),
auditing by a big-4 firm (AFS), larger boards (BSE),
diversed boards (BD) and profitable (TSR, Q and ROA)
firms pay significantly higher remuneration to their
CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors.
Multivariate regression analyses
The empirical findings of the effect of corporate
governance disclosure index on executive pay. Table 6
presents the empirical findings of the impact of corporate
governance disclosure index (CGI) containing 31 key
components developed from 120 corporate governance
provisions, on CEO pay. Specifically, the table contains
the results relating to the effect of corporate governance
disclosure index on the pay package of CEOs explaining
cash, non-cash and total pay as the dependent variables,
respectively. Prior studies suggest that good corporate
governance structures may help in reducing agency
problems by increasing managerial monitoring capacity,
and thus prevent executives from expropriating
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama,
1980). To test this, we examine the effect of the CGI on
executive pay. The coefficients of CGI on cash, non-cash
and total pay for CEOs (1.199,2.578 and 2.026) in
Table 6 are statistically negative at 1%. Overall, the results
provide empirical support for H1.
The empirical findings of the CGI along with the
control variables on CFOs and AEDs’ pay are reported in
Table 7 (to further account for potential size-effects in the
total pay of all other executive directors, we run median
regressions). It contains the results for six models relating
to CFOs and all other executive directors explaining cash,
non-cash and total pay. The coefficients of CGI on cash,
non-cash and total pay for CFOs (0.976, 2.065
and  1.454) and all other executive directors (1.314,
2.451 and  1.971) are negative and statistically
CG Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus 15
© 2018 European Academy of Management
significant, suggesting that our first hypothesis (H1) is
empirically supported.
In addition to examining the effect of the CGI on
executive pay for our entire sample, we divided our
sample into two main categories: (i) well-governed firms
(firms having a CGI score above the mean value of
52%); and (ii) poorly-governed firms (firm having a CGI
score below the mean value of 52%). The reason behind
doing this is to provide more informative inferences about
our data. The findings are presented in Table 8. In terms of
well-governed firms, the coefficients of the CGI on the
total pay of CEOs (1.800), CFOs (1.152) and AEDs’
(1.810) pay are negative and statistically significant,
whereas the coefficients of the CGI on the total pay of
CEOs (1.592), CFOs (0.820) and AEDs (1.930)
for poorly-governed firms are negative, but not
statistically significant, suggesting that our first
hypothesis is empirically supported.
The empirical findings of the effect of individual
governance mechanisms and executive pay. Table 6 also
presents the results of pooled OLS regression of board
structure variables (BSE and BD), CEO power measures
(DSPLIT, CEOT and CEOS), and ownership structure
variables (MANO, ISTO and BLKO) along with the
control variables on CEOs’ pay. Specifically, Table 6
contains three models explaining the effect of these eight
individual governance mechanisms (i.e., BSE, BD,
DSPLIT, CEOT, CEOS, MANO, ISTO and BLKO) on
CEOs’ cash, non-cash and total pay. First, and with
reference to the board structure variables, the positive
and significant association between BSE and CEOs’ cash
and total pay provides support for H2. However, the
insignificant effect of BD on cash and total pay of CEOs
does not provide support for H2. Second, the separation
of CEO and chairperson roles (DSPLIT) is negatively
associated with CEOs’ cash and total pay, suggesting that
H3 is empirically support. Similarly, results reported in
Table 6 indicate that both CEO tenure (CEOT) and CEO
pay slice (CEOs) are positively associated with CEOs
pay, implying that H3 is further supported. Finally, and
with reference to the ownership mechanisms, the results
contained in Table 6 suggest that managerial ownership
(MANO) and block ownership (BLKO) are negatively
associated with the CEO pay. This implies that H4 is
empirically supported. However, the insignificant
influence of institutional ownership on CEOs’ pay does
not provide support for H4.
With reference to the effect of the individual
governance mechanisms on CFOs and AEDs’ cash, non-
cash and total pay, the results contained in Table 7 are
generally consistent with our developed hypotheses. First,
the coefficients of BSE on non-cash pay in Model 2 for
CFOs, and those in Models 4 to 6 for AEDs’ cash, non-
Table 5 Bivariate correlations
Variable CGI BSE BD DSPLIT CEOT CEOS CL AFS MANO ISTO BLKO
CGI 0.480*** 0.374*** 0.312*** 0.093** 0.082* 0.517*** 0.523*** 0.618*** 0.260*** 0.507***
BSE 0.440*** 0.381*** 0.011 0.005 0.221*** 0.512*** 0.177*** 0.619*** 0.313*** 0.541***
BD 0.326*** 0.335*** 0.089** 0.000 0.005 0.172*** 0.032 0.367*** 0.255*** 0.364***
DSPLIT 0.307*** 0.016 0.072* 0.019 0.011 0.020 0.273*** 0.120*** 0.020 0.009
CEOT 0.167*** 0.045 0.054 0.074* 0.064 0.112*** 0.009 0.126*** 0.059 0.018
CEOS 0.070* 0.209*** 0.031 0.005 0.063 0.042 0.178*** 0.114*** 0.154*** 0.122***
CL 0.482*** 0.507*** 0.169*** 0.020 0.162*** 0.057 0.244*** 0.530*** 0.288*** 0.405***
AFS 0.558*** 0.195*** 0.021 0.273*** 0.087** 0.167*** 0.224*** 0.265*** 0.009 0.234***
MANO 0.420*** 0.361*** 0.043 0.194*** 0.055 0.083* 0.376*** 0.326*** 0.159*** 0.466***
ISTO 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.225*** 0.017 0.010 0.132*** 0.251*** 0.043 0.025 0.748***
BLKO 0.474*** 0.517*** 0.349*** 0.011 0.078* 0.106** 0.377*** 0.255*** 0.291*** 0.722***
LTA 0.453*** 0.809*** 0.388*** 0.031 0.047 0.044 0.525*** 0.151*** 0.446*** 0.209*** 0.493***
CEX 0.076* 0.096** 0.097** 0.018 0.023 0.155*** 0.208*** 0.045 0.028 0.086** 0.091**
RIS 0.028 0.136*** 0.186*** 0.012 0.154*** 0.096* 0.150*** 0.071 0.048 0.100* 0.133***
SG 0.028 0.091** 0.029 0.001 0.034 0.003 0.071* 0.012 0.004 0.057 0.045
ROA 0.147*** 0.297*** 0.239*** 0.053 0.162*** 0.119*** 0.218*** 0.010 0.078* 0.093** 0.187***
TSR 0.073* 0.014 0.067 0.006 0.078* 0.035 0.052 0.016 0.011 0.094** 0.058
Q 0.233*** 0.190*** 0.104** 0.121*** 0.028 0.042 0.099** 0.148*** 0.256*** 0.178*** 0.207***
CEOP 0.580*** 0.693*** 0.443*** 0.026 0.000 0.202*** 0.476*** 0.312*** 0.534*** 0.302*** 0.610***
CFOP 0.546*** 0.724*** 0.488*** 0.082* 0.064 0.012 0.503*** 0.234*** 0.470*** 0.342*** 0.630***
AEDP 0.456*** 0.753*** 0.445*** 0.034 0.007 0.026 0.443*** 0.238*** 0.505*** 0.287*** 0.559***
The upper right half of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation, while the bottom left half of the table presents the coefficients
relating to Pearson’s correlation. CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic
diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA
denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; TSR denotes total shareholder return; ROA denotes return
on assets; Q denotes Tobin’s Q; CEOP, CFOP and AEDP denote natural log of total CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors pay, respectively. ***,
**, and* indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively
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Table 5 Continued
LTA CEX RIS SG ROA TSR Q CEOP CFOP AEDP
0.527*** 0.107*** 0.207*** 0.069* 0.236*** 00.114*** 0.239*** 0.617*** 0.584*** 0.534***
0.809*** 0.121*** 0.310*** 0.089** 0.310*** 00.033 0.220*** 0.696*** 0.730*** 0.613***
0.418*** 0.126*** 0.194*** 0.007 0.247*** 00.095** 0.151*** 0.470*** 0.511*** 0.456***
0.036 0.002 0.086* 0.004 0.031 00.017 0.118*** 0.031 0.074* 0.039
0.017 0.094** 0.172*** 0.085** 0.173*** 00.115*** 0.070* 0.042 0.016 0.052
0.050 0.145*** 0.061 0.008 0.134*** 00.030 0.047 0.181*** 0.023 0.027
0.533*** 0.241*** 0.075 0.079* 0.268*** 00.058 0.090** 0.518*** 0.515*** 0.480***
0.166*** 0.060 0.081 0.005 0.013 00.017 0.124*** 0.309*** 0.234*** 0.243***
0.754*** 0.156*** 0.308*** 0.036 0.333*** 00.033 0.297*** 0.749*** 0.740*** 0.689***
0.260*** 0.019 0.010 0.100** 0.157*** 00.136*** 0.166*** 0.321*** 0.372*** 0.322***
0.531*** 0.002 0.116** 0.095** 0.245*** 00.097** 0.233*** 0.620*** 0.642*** 0.606***
0.189*** 0.487*** 0.128*** 0.504*** 00.093** 0.268*** 0.861*** 0.876*** 0.779***
0.151*** 0.252*** 0.103** 0.225*** 0.048 0.111*** 0.157*** 0.212*** 0.102**
0.326*** 0.125** 0.090* 0.328*** 0.041 0.209*** 0.349*** 0.366*** 0.284***
0.109*** 0.102** 0.063 0.277*** 00.008 0.019 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.118***
0.512*** 0.161*** 0.412*** 0.216*** 00.243*** 0.067 0.487*** 0.484*** 0.430***
0.066 0.073* 0.087* 0.014 0.222*** 0.014 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.156***
0.251*** 0.106*** 0.263*** 0.051 0.083** 0.044 0.298*** 0.220*** 0.293***
0.852*** 0.073* 0.222*** 0.084** 0.456*** 0.125*** 0.293*** 0.937*** 0.953***
0.874*** 0.109** 0.254*** 0.114** 0.468*** 0.125*** 0.233*** 0.931*** 0.925***
0.775*** 0.019 0.188*** 0.080* 0.398*** 00.119*** .280*** .951*** .926***
Table 6 Effect of corporate governance structure on CEOs’ pay (CEOP)
Dep. variable (model). Annual_Cash (1) Annual_Non-cash (2) Total (3) VIF
Corporate governance index:
CGI 1.199(0.000)*** 2.578(0.003)*** 2.026(0.000)*** 3.060
Board structure:
BSE 0.282(0.025)** 0.157(0.648) 0.385(0.008)*** 3.287
BD 0.025(0.913) 1.518(0.016)** 0.352(0.182) 1.630
CEO power:
DSPLIT 0.438(0.000)*** 0.255(0.348) 0.050(0.654) 1.494
CEOT 0.007(0.150) 0.057(0.000)*** 0.029(0.000)*** 1.233
CEOS 1.250(0.000)*** 2.674(0.000)**** 2.065(0.000)*** 1.344
Ownership structure:
MANO 1.631(0.000)*** 1.994(0.106) 2.365(0.000)*** 2.343
ISTO 0.080(0.649) 0.249(0.599) 0.089(0.655) 2.537
BLKO 0.241(0.275) 1.575(0.010)*** 0.592(0.019)** 3.807
Controls:
AFS 0.000(0.955) 0.013(0.000)*** 0.002(0.056)* 1.864
LTA 0.299(0.000)*** 0.497(0.000)*** 0.373(0.000)*** 5.834
CEX 0.776(0.189) 1.742(0.279) 0.621(0.356) 1.244
RIS 0.728(0.000)*** 1.338(0.012)** 1.032(0.000)*** 1.735
SG 0.127(0.356) 0.239(0.522) 0.250(0.112) 1.224
CL 0.225(0.001)*** 0.139(0.585) 0.113(0.159) 1.941
IDU YES YES YES -
YDU YES YES YES -
Constant 7.451*** 2.341** 5.897*** -
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.175 2.147 2.171 -
F- value 109.465*** 39.181*** 128.614*** -
Adj. R2 0.883 0.731 0.899 -
No. of observations 600 600 600 -
CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation
of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes
institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS
denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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cash and total pay, are all negative and statistically
significant. This implies that H2 is accepted. However,
the insignificant influence of BD on CFOs and AEDs’
cash and total pay does not provide support for H2.
Second, the insignificant effect of DSPLIT and CEOS on
CFOs and AEDs’ pay does not provide support for H3,
whereas the positive and significant effect of CEOT on
CFOs and AEDs’ pay is in line with H3. Finally, the
negative and significant effect of both MANO and BLKO
on CFOs and AEDs’ pay is consistent with H4. In terms
of institutional ownership (ISTO), the coefficients on the
cash pay in Model 1 for CFOs, and those in Models 4–6
for AEDs are all positive, but statistically insignificant,
indicating that ISTO has no influence on cash pay of
CFOs, and on cash, non-cash and total pay of AEDs.
Similarly, the positive and significant influence of ISTO
on non-cash and total pay of CFOs does not provide
support for H4.
The results relating to executive pay-performance nexus.
The empirical findings of the executive pay along with
the control variables on corporate performance are
reported in Table 9. It contains the results of nine models
relating to CEOs (Columns 2–4), CFOs (Columns 5–7)
and all other executive directors (Columns 8–10)
explaining cash, non-cash and total pay. The coefficients
of TSR on executive pay (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs) are
observably small (ranging from 0.455 for CEOs’ non-cash
pay to 0.142 for CFOs cash pay), which lends empirical
support for H5. Additionally, the empirical findings
relating to the potential moderating effect of corporate
governance disclosure index (i.e., CGI) on the PPS are
reported in Table 10. Specifically, Table 10 reports
findings relating to TSR, Q and ROA performance
measures for the total CEO pay (Models 1–3), Models 4
to 6 do similarly for the CFO measure, while Models 7
to 9 report similar results for all other executive directors
alternative. In addition, all control variables contained in
Table 9 are included in Table 10. Crucially, it is clearly
observable from our results that, regardless of the
executive pay proxy used, the PPS has noticeably
improved, implying that H6 is empirically supported.
Finally, we carried out several additional tests to check
the robustness of our results. Specifically, we run four
Table 8 Effect of corporate governance structure on total CEOs, CFOs and all other executive directors’ (AEDs)
Good-governed firms Poorly-governed firms
Dep. variable (model) CEO total pay (1) CFO total pay (2) AED total pay (3) CEO total pay (4) CFO total pay (5) AED total pay (6)
Corporate governance index:
CGI 1.800(0.001)*** 1.152(0.006)*** 1.810(0.001)*** 1.592(0.220) 0.820(0.637) 1.930(0.149)
Board structure:
BSE 0.177(0.286) 0.049(0.804) 0.234(0.169) 0.173(0.667) 1.118(0.047)** 0.445(0.285)
BD 0.068(0.814) 0.186(0.595) 0.118(0.691) 0.406(0.712) 0.922(0.537) 0.641(0.571)
CEO power:
DSPLIT 0.131(0.409) 0.063(0.755) 0.156(0.338) 0.347(0.140) 0.148(0.576) 0.290(0.229)
CEOT 0.033(0.000)*** 0.031(0.000)*** 0.033(0.000)*** 0.003(0.884) 0.005(0.817) 0.000(0.986)
CEOS 1.834(0.000)*** 0.094(0.683) 0.198(0.298) 2.907(0.000)*** 0.143(0.852) 0.525(0.405)
Ownership structure:
MANO 2.643(0.000)*** 1.781(0.039)** 2.581(0.000)*** 3.241(0.001)*** 0.985(0.435) 3.440(0.000)***
ISTO 0.306(0.151) 0.463(0.069)* 0.255(0.242) 1.161(0.219) 0.336(0.805) 0.880(0.362)
BLKO 0.375(0.072)* 0.057(0.861) 0.392(0.163) 0.523(0.715) 0.254(0.895) 0.269(0.855)
Controls:
AFS 0.047(0.704) 0.026(0.865) 0.059(0.639) 0.367(0.128) 1.046(0.003)*** 0.350(0.157)
LTA 0.416(0.000)*** 0.379(0.000)*** 0.410(0.000)*** 0.362(0.000)*** 0.432(0.001)*** 0.311(0.001)***
CEX 0.827(0.269) 0.675(0.459) 0.987(0.199) 2.977(0.240) 2.206(0.454) 3.231(0.215)
RIS 1.216(0.000)*** 0.749(0.024)** 1.239(0.000)*** 0.139(0.862) 0.425(0.657) 0.409(0.617)
SG 0.388(0.038)** 0.321(0.162) 0.401(0.036)** 0.398(0.207) 0.405(0.251) 0.418(0.197)
CL 0.012(0.902) 0.227(0.053)* 0.020(0.843) 0.284(0.226) 0.690(0.016)** 0.351(0.148)
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 5.448*** 6.391*** 7.242*** 6.985*** 8.249*** 9.432***
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.106 2.165 2.134 1.916 2.086 1.916
F- value 84.309*** 42.042*** 79.051*** 54.995*** 21.627*** 46.599***
Adj. R2 0.876 0.783 0.868 0.974 0.907 0.970
No. of observations 447 447 447 153 153 153
CGI denotes the corporate governance disclosure index; BSE denotes board size; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separation
of CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEOS denotes CEO pay slice; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes
institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; AFS denotes audit firm size; LTA denotes firm size; CEX denotes capital expenditure; RIS
denotes risk; SG denotes sales growth; CL denotes cross-listing; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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different tests: (i) fixed-effects model; (ii) lagged structure
model; (iii) generalised method of moments estimator
(GMM); and (iv) Heckman (1979) sample selection bias
test, which for brevity not reported, but will be available
upon request. Overall, the findings of these additional
analyses indicated that our results were not driven by
any potential endogenity and sample selection bias
problems.
Discussion
Columns 2–4 of Table 6 reports results relating to the
effect of theCGI on cash, non-cash and total pay of CEOs,
respectively. The associated coefficients of the CGI are
negative and statistically significant, supporting the view
that well-governed firms pay significantly lower levels
of remuneration to their CEOs than their poorly-governed
counterparts. Similarly, the results reported in Columns
2–4 and 6–8 of Table 7 relating to CFOs and AEDs,
respectively, suggest that well-governed firms pay
significantly lower cash, non-cash and total pay to their
CFOs and all other executive directors, than their
poorly-governed counterparts. The negative effect of the
CGI lends empirical support for the recommendations of
UK corporate governance codes (e.g., 1992 Cadbury
Report and 2012 Combined Code) and the findings of past
corporate governance studies (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2009;
Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015.Theoretically,
our evidence offers empirical support for both managerial
power hypothesis and optimal contracting theory,
indicating that under poor governance conditions
(managerial power hypothesis) managers can control the
board and reward themselves with overly generous pay
packages (Ozkan, 2007; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b),
whereas under good corporate governance conditions
(optimal contracting theory), managers have less
influence on their pay, and thereby allowing the board to
design pay packages that may be more closely aligned
with executive performance (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009;
Dong, 2014).
To examine the robustness of the obtained findings
(reported in Tables 6 and 7) relating to the effect of the
CGI on CEOs, CFOs and AEDs’ pay, we divide our
sample using the mean value of the CGI. This resulted
in having two groups (i.e., well-governed and poorly-
governed firms). The results reported in Table 8 suggest
that firms with higher CGI scores tend to pay their
executive significantly lower than their poorly-governed
firms (i.e., firms with lower CGI scores). The findings
indicate that under good governance structures, executive
pay packages are designed in a way that helps in aligning
management and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). However, under weak governance
structures, opportunistic executives can expropriate
the wealth of shareholders by having the power to
influence their own pay (Choe et al., 2014; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997).
In terms of the individual governance mechanisms,
most of them bear the expected sign. For example, the
findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 reveal that board
diversity, along with splitting the CEO and chairperson
positions are associated negatively with the cash-based
and total pay for CEOs, which is consistent with the
findings of prior studies (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Conyon and He, 2011). By contrast, they are positively
linked with the non-cash-based pay for CEOs, CFOs and
AEDs, suggesting that board diversity and splitting of
the CEO and chairperson positions help to align
management and shareholders’ interests by increasing
board independence from management. Additionally, we
have found evidence that board size and CEO tenure
impact positively on CEO pay, as reported by Conyon
and He (2012), Guest (2009) and Ozkan (2011).
Theoretically, these findings support the view that firms
with larger boards and longer-tenured CEOs suffer agency
problems that arise from empowering CEOs to have
greater control of the board, and that can increase the
influence of CEOs over the decisions made by the board,
and thereby allowing CEOs to pay themselves excessively
high (Ozkan, 2007; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b). In
contrary, the coefficients of BSE on the non-cash and total
pay inModels 2 and 3 for CFOs, and those in Models 4–6
for AEDs, are negative. This implies that larger boards are
more difficult to be controlled by CFOs and other
executive directors (not CEOs) compared to smaller
boards because they are associated with more expertise
and experience. That can restrain the influence of CFOs
and AEDs over the decisions made by the board, and
thereby allowing the board to design pay packages that
are closely aligned with executive performance (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990).
With reference to CEO pay slice (CEOS), the results
reported in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that CEOS is positively
and significantly associated with cash, non-cash and total
pay of CEOs, but insignificantly associated with CFOs
and AEDs pay. The significant effect of the CEOS on
CEOs’ pay is consistent with the findings of Bebchuk
et al. (2011) and Tian and Yang (2014), implying that the
concentration of power in CEOs can reduce the
monitoring role of the board on CEOs, which can allow
CEOs to reward themselves with overly generous pay
packages.
In terms of ownership structure variables, the results
contained in Tables 6 and 7 for the three models relating
to their effect on the pay of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs are
mixed. Specifically, and in line with previous studies
(e.g., Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 2015), our
evidence reveals that managerial ownership and block
ownership are associated with lower CEO pay, implying
22 M.H. Elmagrhi et al.
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that higher managerial ownership and block ownership
help to align management and shareholders’ interests by
bringing more effective monitoring on the opportunistic
behaviour of management (Wang and Xiao, 2011). In
contrast, our evidence shows that institutional ownership
is insignificantly associated with CEOs’ pay, suggesting
that institutional investors are passive and ineffective in
monitoring management (Dong and Ozkan, 2008).
With reference to the PPS, the results contained in
Table 9 suggest that there is a positive, but weak link
between executive pay and performance, and this is
consistent with the findings of Adams and Ferreira
(2009). Theoretically, our evidence offers support for the
predictions of managerial power hypothesis, which views
executive pay as a result of close negotiations between
weak/dependent board and strong executives that may
lead to the design of ineffective incentive contracts that
tend to increase agency problems (Choe et al., 2014;
Mallin et al., 2015). Thus, managerial power hypothesis
predicts a weak PPS, due to the assumption that
executives have strong influence in setting their own pay
(Van Essen et al., 2015).
Table 10 contains OLS regression results investigating
the potential moderating effect of CGI on the PPS.
Overall, the results suggest that corporate governance
significantly moderates the PPS. For instance, the
magnitude of the coefficient of the TSR on the total pay
of CEO has improved from 0.242 in Model 3 of
Table 10, to 0.466 in model (1) of Table 10. The results,
therefore, provide empirical support for H6 that CGI
moderates the association between executive pay and
performance, with the PPS being stronger in firms with
good corporate governance practices. Similarly, the
magnitude of the coefficient of the TSR on the total CFO
and all other executive director pay has improved from
0.197 (model (3)) and 0.247 (Model 9) of Table 9 to
0.583 (model (4)) and 0.416 (model (7)) of Table 10,
respectively, implying that firm-level corporate
governance moderates the PPS, with the PPS being
stronger in firms with good CG practices (Sapp, 2008;
Newton, 2015).
We also used tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) as
market and accounting-based alternative performance
proxies to check the robustness of our findings. These
alternative performance proxies have been used in this
study because they are considered to be appropriate and
also because they have excessively been used in the prior
literature (e.g., Conyon, 1997; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2016;
Ozkan, 2011). The results generally indicate that corporate
governance significantly moderates the PPS. Observably,
and on a comparison basis, our evidence suggests that
the PPS is higher (significant at 1% level) for CEO and
CFO than all other executive pay (significant at 5%),
and this may due to the strategic nature of CEO and
CFO roles (Ntim et al., 2017).
Finally, and with regard to the interaction variables, the
results presented in Table 10 generally offer evidence of a
moderating impact of firm-level corporate governance
(CGI) on the PPS, which largely supports our hypothesis
(H6), as well as the predictions of optimal contracting
theory. Specifically, the statistically significant and
negative effect of P*CGI on CEO, CFO or all other
executive directors pay in models (1) to (9) of Table 10
provides support for H6. The interacted variable (CGI)
has improved the magnitude of TSR, Q and ROA and this
suggests that strong corporate governance quality (in the
form of higher compliance with 2012 Combined Code)
moderates the association between executive pay and
performance, with the PPS being stronger in firms with
good corporate governance practices. Observably, our
findings contribute to a small, but increasing number of
evidence, which suggests that firm-level corporate
governance has a moderating impact on the PPS
(Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 2015; Ntim et al.,
2017). Table 11 provides a summary of the empirical
findings and the hypothesised relationships among
the corporate governance mechanisms, executive pay
and PPS.
Conclusions
This study examines whether corporate governance
structures do influence executive directors’ pay, and
consequently ascertains whether corporate governance
can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS)
for UK listed firms. Specifically, we investigate the
impact of firm-level corporate governance quality on the
Table 11 A summary of the findings and hypotheses
Hypotheses Descriptions Results
H1 There is a statistically significant negative association between firm-level corporate
governance disclosure index score and executive pay.
Accepted
H2 There is a statistically significant association between board structure and executive pay. Rejected
H3 There is a statistically significant association between CEO power and executive pay. Generally accepted
H4 There is a statistically significant association between ownership structure and executive pay. Generally accepted
H5 There is a statistically positive link between executive pay and performance (PPS). Accepted
H6 Corporate governance moderates the association between executive pay and performance,
with the PPS being stronger in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms.
Accepted
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cash, non-cash and total pay for chief executive officers
(CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), as well as all
other executive directors (AEDs). Additionally, we
examine the link between executive pay (CEOs, CFOs
and AEDs) and corporate performance, and consequently
examine the moderating influence of corporate
governance disclosure index on the PPS. Our study,
therefore, extends, as well as makes a number of new
contributions to the growing body of literature on the
antecedents of executive pay.
First, we contribute to the literature by employing a
principal component analysis technique to develop and
introduce a new alternative governance disclosure index
containing 31 key components out of 120 comprehensive
governance provisions from the UK Combined Code for
UK firms and researchers. Second, we extend and
contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact
of our newly developed corporate governance disclosure
index on executive pay. There is a scarcity of studies that
have investigated the impact of corporate governance
disclosure index on executive pay. The findings indicate
that companies with stronger corporate governance
structures tend to pay their executives significantly lower
than their poorly-governed counterparts, and thereby
providing support for both the optimal contracting theory
and managerial power hypothesis.
Third, previous studies examining the impact of
corporate governance on executive pay have almost
examined only the impact of few individual corporate
governance variables on CEOs pay, whereas studies
which have examined the impact of board structure,
CEO power and ownership mechanisms on executive
pay are scarce. Therefore, this study contributes to the
extant literature by examining the link among board
structure (board size and board diversity), CEO power
(CEO tenure, CEO duality and CEO pay slice), ownership
(managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block
ownership) and executive pay (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs).
Overall, the results indicate that board structure, CEO
power and ownership variables have a significant impact
on executive pay among UK firms.
Fourth, the study reports empirical evidence of a
positive, but weak link between executive pay and
corporate performance. Our evidence supports managerial
power hypothesis perspective, which predicts weak PPS.
Managerial power hypothesis suggests that in cor-
porations with weak corporate governance structures,
executives tend to have strong influence over setting their
own pay, leading to a weak PPS. The evidence of a
positive, but weak PPS lends support for the findings of
past corporate governance studies (e.g., Jensen and
Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Cheng and
Firth, 2005; Schultz et al., 2013; Amzaleg et al., 2014).
Fifth, previous studies (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011,
2012; Choe et al., 2014) have only examined the PPS
without taking into account possible endogeneity
concerns that may result from simultaneous use of both
monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms by
corporations to mitigate agency problems. Therefore, this
study aimed to extend, as well as contribute to the existing
studies by investigating why and how corporate
governance can moderate the PPS. We find that the PPS
improves considerably in firms with good corporate
governance structures. This evidence provides support
for optimal contracting theory, which suggests that in
firms with good corporate governance mechanisms,
executive pay packages can be designed in a way that
helps to align management and shareholders’ interests,
and thereby improving the PPS.
Sixth, the results of the study have important
implications for policy-makers and regulators of other
countries that are intending to or are currently pursuing
corporate governance and executive director pay policy
reforms. The major implication of our findings is that
policy reforms relating to monitoring (corporate
governance) and incentive alignment (executive pay)
should be pursued jointly for greater effectiveness. The
methodological implication of the evidence is that firm-
level corporate governance moderates the PPS provides
new empirical insights from the managerial power
hypothesis and optimal contracting theory. Further and
methodologically, future researchers may be able to
employ our new governance disclosure index as an
alternative to the US-centric ones.
Seventh, the evidence provided in this paper offers
potential empirical and theoretical insight for future
studies. In terms of empirical expansions, this paper
focused only on the UK, however, future research can
extend our study by examining the impact of corporate
governance on executive pay and consequently whether
corporate governance moderates the PPS in different
international governance environments (i.e., developing
and/or developed countries with different economic
systems and characteristics). With reference to theoretical
expansions, the evidence indicates that future studies can
possibly enhance their theoretical grounds by relying on
the insights provided by other closely related governance
theories, including equity fairness, lake ‘Wobegon’ effect,
managerial talent, stewardship and tournament theories,
when examining the drivers of executive pay.
Finally, although the results of this study are robust to
alternative estimations and models, our study has some
limitations, including limiting our analysis to only internal
corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, and as data
becomes accessible, future studies can consider how both
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms
can influence executive pay. The current study has
examined the factors driving executive pay from a
quantitative perspective, any future research can enhance
our understanding by conducting in-depth interviews
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and qualitative analysis to gain further insights relating to
the drivers of executive pay and the PPS. Also, like most
archival research of this nature, the proxies for
governance, pay and performance may or may not reflect
actual practice. For example, governance quality may
simply refer to disclosure of governance rather than actual
governance quality of a firm, which is very difficult to
observe in practice. Further, due to the labour intensive
nature of manual data collection, we limited our sample
to a relatively smaller size and therefore, could arguably
influence the generalisability of our findings, although
the findings of the Heckman (1979) sample selection
bias suggest that this may not be the case. Future
research may, therefore, improve upon the current study
by employing a much larger sample size. Similarly, we
restricted our analysis to the period after the 2007/08
global financial crisis, since prior UK studies have
investigated the period before the global financial crisis.
In this case, future studies may improve our analysis
by including the period before and after the 2007/08
crisis and examine whether the crisis has had an effect
on the link among corporate governance, pay and
performance.
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Appendix 1. Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI)
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to Scoring
Leadership Sub-Index
(i) Board structure 1. Board membership 0–1
2. Role duality 0–1
3. Frequency of board meetings (BMs) 0–1
4. Individual directors’ attendance of BMs 0–1
5. Attendance of the majority of BMs 0–1
6. Statement on chairperson’s independence 0–1
7. Senior independent director appointment 0–1
8. Roles of the board and management 0–1
Effectiveness Sub-Index
(ii) Board and directors 9. Board chairperson is non-executive director (NED) 0–1
10. Chairperson independence 0–1
11. Board composition 0–1
12. Classification of directors 0–1
(iii) Board and directors’ evaluation 13. Process of evaluating board/executives 0–1
14. Evaluation of board performance 0–1
15. Evaluation of individual directors’ performance 0–1
16. Evaluation of board’s committees’ performance 0–1
17. Evaluation of CEO’s performance 0–1
18. Evaluation of chairperson’s performance 0–1
19. Externally facilitated evaluation 0–1
(iv) Re-election of board’s members 20. Process of board/executives’ re-election 0–1
21. Directors’ names 0–1
22. Directors’ biographical details 0–1
23. Directors other details 0–1
24. Directors’ experience 0–1
(v) Induction and training programmes 25. Induction and training provided to all directors 0–1
26. Details on training programmes 0–1
(vi) Free legal advice 27. Access to free independent legal advice 0–1
(vii) Insider trading/dealing 28. Directors/officers dealings and securities 0–1
29. Directors/officers share dealings 0–1
(viii) Nomination committee (NC) 30. Existence 0–1
31. Terms of reference 0–1
32. Membership 0–1
33. Composition 0–1
34. Chairperson independence 0–1
35. Frequency of NC meetings 0–1
36. Individual members’ attendance of NC meetings 0–1
37. Attendance of the majority of NC meetings 0–1
38. Evaluation of the committee as a group 0–1
39. Evaluation of chairperson 0–1
40. Evaluation of individual members 0–1
(ix) Office of a company secretary 41. Existence 0–1
42. Identity 0–1
43. Terms of reference 0–1
44. Attendance of board’s meetings 0–1
45. Meeting attendance record 0–1
Accountability Sub-Index
(x) Board accountability 46. Preparing annual report and accounts 0–1
47. Status of a firm’s going concern 0–1
(xi) Audit committee (AC) 48. Existence 0–1
49. Reviewing risk management systems 0–1
50. Terms of reference 0–1
51. Membership 0–1
52. Composition 0–1
53. Chairperson independence 0–1
54. Frequency of AC meeting 0–1
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Table (Continued)
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to Scoring
55. Individual members’ attendance of AC meetings 0–1
56. Attendance of the majority of AC meetings 0–1
57. External auditor’s scope and responsibility 0–1
58. External audit meetings 0–1
59. External audit private meetings 0–1
60. Audit fees 0–1
61. Evaluation of audit committee as a group 0–1
62. Evaluation of chairperson 0–1
63. Evaluation of individual members 0–1
(xii) Risk management 64. Actual and potential risks 0–1
65. Risk evaluation 0–1
66. Policy of risk management 0–1
67. Risk management committee (RMC) 0–1
68. Terms of reference 0–1
69. Membership 0–1
70. Composition 0–1
71. Frequency of RMC meetings 0–1
72. Individual members’ attendance of RMC meetings 0–1
73. Attendance of the majority of RMC meetings 0–1
74. Evaluation of risk committee as a group 0–1
75. Evaluation of chairperson 0–1
76. Evaluation of individual members 0–1
(xiii) Internal audit and control 77. Internal control policy and procedure 0–1
78. Existence of internal audit unit 0–1
79. Annual meetings with audit committee 0–1
80. Private meetings with audit committee 0–1
81. Review of risk and internal control systems 0–1
Remuneration Sub-Index
(xiv) Remuneration committee (RC) 82. Existence 0–1
83. Membership 0–1
84. Composition 0–1
85. Chairperson independence 0–1
86. Frequency of RC meetings 0–1
87. Individual members’ attendance of RC meetings 0–1
88. Attendance of the majority of RC meetings 0–1
89. Evaluation of chairperson 0–1
90. Evaluation of individual members 0–1
91. Terms of reference 0–1
92. CEO’s remuneration 0–1
93. Other directors’ remuneration 0–1
94. All directors’ cash remuneration 0–1
95. NEDs’ remuneration 0–1
96. All directors’ non-cash remuneration 0–1
97. Say on executive pay policy 0–1
98. Directors’ ownership interests 0–1
99. Composition of NEDs’ remuneration 0–1
100. Remuneration consultants 0–1
101. All directors’ remuneration by name 0–1
102. Directors’ long-term incentive plan 0–1
103. Directors’ remuneration philosophy 0–1
Relations with shareholders sub-Index 104. Obligations to shareholders 0–1
105. Notice on annual general meetings (AGMs) 0–1
106. Disclosure of shareholders’ rights 0–1
107. Names of board member attend AGM 0–1
108. Board chairman attendance of AGM 0–1
109. NC chairman attendance of AGM 0–1
110. RC chairman attendance of AGM 0–1
111. AC chairman attendance of AGM 0–1
112. RMC chairman attendance of AGM 0–1
113. Shareholder activism 0–1
114. Proxy voting policy 0–1
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Table (Continued)
CGI theme CGI items: information on or reference to Scoring
115. Obligations to society/community 0–1
116. Environmental issues 0–1
117. Social issues 0–1
118. Employee training and education programmes 0–1
119. Health and safety 0–1
120. Code of ethics 0–1
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Appendix 2. Loadings on individual corporate governance provisions for each of the 31
components.
Principal component (factor) CGI items: information on or reference to Loading value
Leadership sub-index
Principal component No. 1 4. Individual directors’ attendance of BMs 0.896
5. Attendance of the majority of BMs 0.892
3. Frequency of board meetings (BMs) 0.672
7. Senior independent director appointment 0.621
Principal component No. 2 2. Role duality 0.842
6. Statement on chairperson’s independence 0.622
Principal component No. 3 8. Roles of the board and management 0.713
1. Board membership 0.522
Effectiveness sub-index
Principal component No. 4 16. Evaluation of board’s committees’ performance 0.916
15. Evaluation of individual directors’ performance 0.879
38. Evaluation of the committee as a group 0.877
14. Evaluation of board performance 0.812
13. Process of evaluating board/executives 0.779
17. Evaluation of CEO’s performance 0.650
36. Individual members’ attendance of NC meetings 0.558
37. Attendance of the majority of NC meetings 0.544
43. Terms of reference of a company secretary 0.501
Principal component no. 5 32. Membership of NC 0.899
30. Existence of NC 0.878
33. Composition of NC 0.796
31. Terms of reference of NC 0.666
20. Process of board/executives’ re-election 0.556
Principal component no. 6 39. Evaluation of chairperson 0.937
40. Evaluation of individual members 0.937
18. Evaluation of chairperson’s performance 0.440
Principal component no. 7 42. Identity of a company secretary 0.806
12. Classification of directors 0.742
41. Existence of a company secretary 0.731
Principal component no. 8 10. Chairperson independence 0.847
34. Chairperson independence of NC 0.753
9. Board chairperson is non-executive director (NED) 0.439
Principal component no. 9 26. Details on training programmes 0.798
25. Induction and training provided to all directors 0.637
29. Directors/officers share dealings 0.532
Principal component no. 10 45. Meeting attendance record 0.959
44. Attendance of board’s meetings 0.959
Principal component no. 11 24. Directors’ experience 0.858
22. Directors’ biographical details 0.823
Principal component no. 12 28. Directors/officers dealings and securities 0.812
23. Directors other details 0.571
Principal component no. 13 35. Frequency of NC meetings 0.571
27. Access to free independent legal advice 0.527
11. Board composition 0.425
Accountability sub-index
Principal component no. 14 73. Attendance of the majority of RMC meetings 0.928
71. Frequency of RMC meetings 0.928
72. Individual members’ attendance of RMC meetings 0.928
76. Evaluation of individual members 0.879
74. Evaluation of risk committee as a group 0.671
75. Evaluation of chairperson 0.671
Principal component no. 15 79. Annual meetings with audit committee 0.846
80. Private meetings with audit committee 0.767
78. Existence of internal audit unit 0.700
58. External audit meetings 0.626
59. External audit private meetings 0.595
61. Evaluation of audit committee as a group 0.491
52. Composition of AC 0.459
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Table (Continued)
Principal component (factor) CGI items: information on or reference to Loading value
65. Risk evaluation 0.407
Principal component no. 16 60. Audit fees 0.825
47. Status of a firm’s going concern 0.805
81. Review of risk and internal control systems 0.754
46. Preparing annual report and accounts 0.697
Principal component no. 17 67. Risk management committee (RMC) 0.853
68. Terms of reference of RMC 0.786
69. Membership of RMC 0.739
49. Reviewing risk management systems 0.667
Principal component no. 18 51. Membership of AC 0.932
48. Existence of AC 0.932
77. Internal control policy and procedure 0.681
Principal component no. 19 63. Evaluation of individual members 0.857
62. Evaluation of chairperson 0.849
70. Composition of RMC 0.452
Principal component no. 20 55. Individual members’ attendance of AC meetings 0.870
56. Attendance of the majority of AC meetings 0.860
Principal component no. 21 66. Policy of risk management 0.740
53. Chairperson independence of AC 0.566
54. Frequency of AC meeting 0.544
50. Terms of reference of AC 0.489
Principal component no. 22 57. External auditor’s scope and responsibility 0.714
64. Actual and potential risks 0.542
Remuneration sub-index
Principal component no. 23 101. All directors’ remuneration by name 0.890
103. Directors’ remuneration philosophy 0.860
82. Existence of RC 0.837
95. NEDs’ remuneration 0.836
94. All directors’ cash remuneration 0.836
83. Membership of RC 0.804
Principal component no. 24 93. Other directors’ remuneration 0.905
92. CEO’s remuneration 0.905
96. All directors’ non-cash remuneration 0.862
102. Directors’ long-term incentive plan 0.554
Principal component no. 25 85. Chairperson independence of RC 0.792
84. Composition of RC 0.740
91. Terms of reference 0.696
86. Frequency of RC meetings 0.571
100. Remuneration consultants 0.496
Principal component no. 26 87. Individual members’ attendance of RC meetings 0.938
90. Evaluation of individual members 0.931
99. Composition of NEDs’ remuneration 0.429
Principal component no. 27 88. Attendance of the majority of RC meetings 0.992
89. Evaluation of chairperson 0.992
Principal component no. 28 111. AC chairman attendance of AGM 0.928
110. RC chairman attendance of AGM 0.918
109. NC chairman attendance of AGM 0.917
107. Names of board member attend AGM 0.908
108. Board chairman attendance of AGM 0.823
112. RMC chairman attendance of AGM 0.432
Relations with Shareholder sub-index
Principal component no. 29 115. Obligations to society/community 0.794
116. Environmental issues 0.776
117. Social issues 0.714
118. Employee training and education programmes 0.702
119. Health and safety 0.685
Principal component no. 30 114. Proxy voting policy 0.670
113. Shareholder activism 0.593
120. Code of ethics 0.562
105. Notice on annual general meetings (AGMs) 0.557
Principal component no. 31 104. Obligations to shareholders 0.872
106. Disclosure of shareholders’ rights 0.577
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